Restructuring of State Policing Post 9/11

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Restructuring of State Policing Post 9/11

By

Joseph Iniguez

B.A. Governors State University, 2002

THESIS

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements

For the Degree of Master of Arts,

With a Major in Political and Justice Studies

Governors State University

University Park, IL 60466

2012
Acknowledgments

First, it is with a heavy heart, and extreme deference, that I acknowledge the ultimate sacrifice of nearly three thousand souls on September 11, 2001. Without their eternal memory, this nation could not rise to the cause of combating terrorism and advancing Homeland Security. They each, in their own distinct and special way, represent what is best about America: diversity, individual identity, and family. It is my hope that this work, inspired from the tragic events of that dreadful day will influence others to implement the reformations needed to strengthen our Homeland Security defenses. To those interested in ascending to this challenge, I wish them God speed and ask them to remember Rudyard Kipling’s poetic refrain – “lest we forget.”

While there are many people to thank for their guidance and encouragement during this difficult process, there are none more important than my family. To my wife, Marjorie, your love, patience, and understanding over the past 25-years have always been unquestioned. You made it possible for me to complete this demanding educational program. As always, you were there when I needed you most. I will cherish you forever. Thank you for never complaining when I had to finish my assignments.

This thesis project marks an end to the graduate program. I am thankful for the guidance of Dr. Chelsea Haring, you assisted me in different ways, providing direction, support and patience in the proper increments. I will always be appreciative and grateful to you.
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Abstract

After September 11, 2001, the United States law enforcement community found itself ill prepared to handle the range of responsibilities required in a nation under the threat of terrorism. Police organizations hastily assigned resources to help mitigate areas hit hard by the attack while dispersing investigative capital to prevent future strikes. A stark realization followed that exposed the challenges of coping with counter-terrorism while balancing finite resources aimed at traditional crime fighting. These added challenges led to the notion that American policing had entered a new era—Homeland Security.

The following research explores the emergence of the new Homeland Security Era and its impact on state policing. More specifically, a case study of the Illinois State Police (ISP) coupled with a multi-state survey of state responses to this challenge further examines how such organizations have transformed their structures by bolstering their intelligence apparatus. This study further examines how state policing has been restructured to respond to changing demands and the changing context of current strategies state police organizations are utilizing in the Homeland Security Era. Using the example of the ISP, the study provides insight into what skills are needed for success in this new policing era. Consequently, this study will explore, first how the terrorist attacks have thrust policing into the new Homeland Security Era. Second, it will address how the events themselves have engendered the question for state law enforcement organizations to consider, including which style of policing best suits these organizations for carrying out their new homeland security mission. Lastly, the research will explore how politics did or did not play a role in the restructuring of the ISP in the new Homeland Security Era.
Chapter I
Introduction to Research Question

Today’s current social life has placed a greater demand on various agencies of social control, such as fire, police and public works. It is especially true for those agencies intending to deal with the problems of crime control. Never has that demand been greater than after September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The threats individual states face and the resources to which they have immediate access are distinct and ever-changing, so each state’s homeland security functions will be organized and operated differently.

For many state police organizations, aftermath of 9/11 has carried with it numerous and varied demands for new policies, new structures, and new strategies to deal with the new security threat. These policing organizations - situated on the front lines across from an unknown enemy often outside the range and authority of the United States military – are at the center of the nation’s homeland security efforts. Supporting this notion, the Northeast Policy Forum identified state law enforcement as being on the “front lines of defense by collecting intelligence/criminal information, communities and our critical infrastructures, hardening vulnerable targets, and preparing for aggressive response to acts of terrorism” (National Criminal Justice Association, NCJA, 2003). This research focuses on the changing role of state policing since 9/11. More specifically, this research examines the role that politics has played in the restructuring of the state police in the new Homeland Security Era. This is particularly relevant as government policymakers and politicians alike continue to frame the states’ role as paramount to the country’s security, but provide an ambiguous framework for how best to carry out this new set of expectations. As a result, states are left to figure out how to restructure state policing to meet these new challenges.
The purpose of this research is threefold. First, it will illustrate how policing, in general, has evolved over time to respond to changing demands and a changing context. Secondly, it will offer an overview and critical discussion of current strategies that state police organizations have utilized in the Homeland Security Era. Finally, the research will use the Illinois State Police as a case study to examine the role that politics has played in changing the policies and structures within state government during the new Homeland Security Era. The attacks of September 11, 2001, served as an impetus for change for in state police organizations, effectively discrediting the status quo of traditional policing. Since the terror attacks, it is widely accepted that in order to prevent terrorism, police must move away from long-established and primarily reactive policing strategies and towards carrying out strategies underscored by the principles of intelligence. Both The National Strategy for Homeland Security Bush, (2002) and The 9/11 Commission Report Kean, (2004) have provided analysis on why government entities must move away from the status quo and draw upon creative means for preventing terrorism while ensuring homeland security. These documents have essentially sounded the call to arms for state law enforcement to change its business processes to include collecting and sharing intelligence to thwart future acts of terrorism.

According to White (2004) there has been no official mandate establishing American police organizations as key elements in our nation’s defense. According to The Council of State Governments (CSG) and Eastern Kentucky University (EKU), (2003) only the rallying call by the media and the public for the police to defend the homeland has thrust them into its newest venue. Anecdotal evidence at the state level, collected shortly after September 11, reveals that state police are practicing many new homeland security roles such as:
• coordinating homeland security at the state level
• collecting, analyzing and sharing critical information and intelligence
• protecting critical infrastructure and key assets
• securing the nation’s border, air, and sea ports
• collaborating with federal and local law enforcement on task forces
• Preparing for new response equipment, tactics, systems, and training.

The new principles and fundamental viewpoints that coincide with policing the homeland foster the notion that policing has entered a new era – the Homeland Security Era.

Success in their new homeland security role, promulgated by the Tenth Amendment and the focus on states’ responsibility for securing themselves, will require state police organizations to advance an agenda for change.¹ The impact of homeland security on state law enforcement is too enormous for organizations to attempt Retrofitting new strategies into old systems or to continue traditional forms of policing. A report from, The Council of State Governments (CSG) and Eastern Kentucky University (EKU), (2003) illustrates the enormous impact of homeland security on state law enforcement through a 50- state survey conducted in 2003 of state and local law enforcement agencies. As Table 1.1 indicates, survey respondents report that changing conditions inherent to homeland security have provided unprecedented roles for state law enforcement.

¹ Also called the Police Powers Amendment, the Tenth Amendment reads, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”
Table 1.1

Key Findings from 50 – State Survey

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<th>Three quarters of state law enforcement agencies report a greater amount of involvement in, or serve as, their state’s leader for gathering, analyzing and sharing terrorism-related intelligence, as well as coordinating and planning for Homeland Security.</th>
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<td>70 percent of state agencies agree that their officers and investigators have significant new Responsibilities in terrorism-related intelligence-gathering, investigations, and emergency response.</td>
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<td>Local law enforcement agencies are requesting and receiving more operational assistance and support from state police today than before Sept. 11, in training, technical assistance, forensic science, specialized services, and help with computer crimes.</td>
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<td>More than 75 percent of state agencies report that their assignment of personnel to Federal task force, including immigration officials, has increased; support for drug and traditional crime investigations has decreased across the states.</td>
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<td>Among many federal agencies, state and local law enforcement most commonly report increased Levels of interaction since Sept. 11 with the FBI, Office for Domestic Preparedness and Immigration and Naturalization.</td>
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<td>More than 60 percent of state police agencies report increases in their interactions with corporate security and private companies concerning facility security and worker background checks.</td>
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According to the survey, state agencies are very much engaged in homeland security initiatives resulting in overtaxed resources and personnel. The term homeland security was not widely used in the United States, if at all, before the Office of Homeland Security’s inception in 2001 following the 9/11 attacks on the nation. After the reorganization and consolidation of nearly 40 governmental agencies, that office would later become the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Homeland security, today, means, the efforts to protect the nation from terrorism, as well as minimizing the damage and facilitating the recovery from manmade and natural disasters. The practice and regulation of homeland security came with the Homeland Security Act (HSA) of (2002), with DHS becoming operational on January 24, 2003. It now has five departmental missions:

- Prevent terrorism and enhance security;
- Secure and manage the nation’s borders;
- Enforce and administer immigration laws;
- Safeguard and secure cyberspace; and
- Ensure resilience to disasters.

Recognizing the difficulties associated with such institutional changes, this research seeks to answer the following questions:

- What impact has September 11, 2001 had on the role and responsibilities of state policing?
- How have states responded to this changing role? (strategies)
- What role has politics played in restructuring state policing in the new homeland security era? (Institutional restructuring)

In order to explore and assess the changes to state policing in a post 9/11 society, it is important to first understand the historical roots and evolution of policing in the United States.
Historical Overview of policing in the United States

Current studies of the police in America tend to explore policy and its interaction between the police and the public. And as Bayley and Shearing (1996) indicate a prediction about the future of policing and suggests policies that are needed to avoid restructuring’s harmful effects. Research on these, and related issues, is of major importance for understanding the impact of police and society and to inform recommendations for changes in policy and police operation. However, the extent of existing research of the historical development and transformation of the police in America is slim. There is a lack of data on the most basic questions of the police in the history of America. How and why were the police created? What were the purposes of the police? How were they structured/organized? How has that evolved over time? What factors impacted the changing nature of policing in the United States?

The rise of the police as an organized force in the western world coincided with the evolution of strong centralized governments. Although police forces have developed throughout the world, often in isolation from one another, the historical growth of the English police is of special significance in America, for it was upon the British model that much of early American policing was based. Records indicate that efforts at law enforcement in early Britain, except for military intervention in the pursuit of bandits and habitual thieves, were not well organized until around the A. D. 1200. When a person committed an offense and could be identified, he or she was usually pursued by an organized posse. All able-bodied men who were in a position to hear the hue and cry raised by the victim were obligated to join the posse in a common effort to

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apprehend the offender. The posse was led by the sheriff (the leader of the county) or by a mounted officer (the comes stabuli). Our modern words sheriff and constable are derived from these early terms. The comite’s stabuli (the plural form of the term) were not uniformed, nor were they numerous enough to perform all the tasks we associate today with law enforcement. This early system employing a small number of mounted officers depended for its effectiveness on the ability of to organize and direct the efforts of citizens toward criminal apprehension.

Most of the works on the police in America are descriptive studies of big city departments. The limited scope of these case studies makes it difficult to develop explanations that reach beyond the individual departments and rather addresses the broader relationships between the police and society. What can be generalized, to an extent, are the origins of American policing and the broader models of policing that have been utilized over time.

American policing has changed significantly since it began in the 1800s. Levin and Meyers (2005) found much of this change has been the result of societal changes and demand more than innovative police management, “Law enforcement has a well-earned reputation for resisting change, especially when change threatens to control law enforcement behavior” (p.4). Certainly, police managers have implemented change, but much of that change was initiated by environmental forces. Such as, political, administrative, community, and justice constituencies. All have common as well as individual special interests.

The basic purposes of policing in democratic societies according to Sutor (1976) are to:

1) Enforce and support the laws of the society of which the police are a part,
2) Investigate crimes and apprehend offenders,
3) Prevent crime,
4) Help ensure domestic peace and tranquility, and
5) Provide the community with needed enforcement-related services.

Simply put, as Sir Robert Peel, founder of the British system of policing, explained in 1822, “The basic mission for which the police exist is to reduce crime and disorder” (Sutor, 1976, p.68).

Towns and cities in colonial America depended on modified versions of the night watch and the day ward, but citizen’s intent on evading their duty dramatically reduced the quality of police service. The English were reluctant to accept the notion of an organized paramilitary police force, feeling it would seriously threaten traditionally prized liberties, such as freedom of movement (Banton, 1973). Despite this reluctance, the reform proposals of men such as Patrick Colquhoun eventually gained widespread support. In 1806, Colquhoun proposed that a well regulated, full time, centrally administered police organization be set up to prevent crime by patrolling the streets of London. Its officers were to be salaried men under the direction of commissioners accountable directly to the government. Colquhoun eventually created the Thames River Police as a compromise between private and public policing as described by (Manning, 1992). In 1829, Parliament enacted the Metropolitan Police Act (MPA) under the leadership of Home Secretary Robert Peel. This Act followed the model for police organization and strategy long advocated by Colquhoun. The “New Police,” or “Bobbie,” in reference to Peel’s first name, had been born. This structure quickly emerged as the inspiration for the modern day police force. The unique experience of the American colonies, however, quickly differentiated the needs of colonists from those of the masses remaining en Europe.
Huge expanses of uncharted territory, vast wealth, a widely dispersed population engaged mostly in agriculture, and sometimes ferocious frontier all combined to mold American police in a distinctive way. Recent scholars such as Sykes (1986) wrote on the history of the American police and observed that policing in America was originally, “decentralized, geographically dispersed, idiosyncratic, and highly personalized.”

Despite the increase of research on the police, the police in America in general, have been the subject of limited scientific study. As Bayley (1985) notes that this “discrepancy between the importance of the police in social life and the amount of attention given them by scholars is so striking as to require explanation.” Bayley (1985), also suggest the lack of research on American policing is a function of their pervasive presence and relatively routine occupational activities, as well their absence as pivotal characters in major historical events. As Leichtman (2008) discusses, the importance of the military model throughout police reform, and how it has coexisted with, rather than been supplanted by, the professional model.

**Models of Policing**

**The Military Model**

One of the first priorities of the reformers was to create a hierarchy in the police force similar to the military structure (Walker, 1977; Fosdick, 1969; and Fogelson, 1977). They turned to the military for a model that best fit this agenda. The Chief would be in command, a strong and independent commissioner or director. His men would spread out under him in a pyramid order of responsibility with departments structured along military lines of command (Fogelson, 1977).
Raymond Fosdick (1969) was the most important spokesman for this position, and both of his books, American Police Systems and European Police Systems, were instrumental in forwarding this view (Walker, 1977). Two examples of Fosdick’s model were August Vollmer and Richard Sylvester, both prominent in the police reform movement. Both became heads of prominent police departments through lateral movement; neither one worked his way up, nor had ever been a patrolman. Vollmer had worked at various jobs before he opened a coal and feed store with a friend in Berkeley, California when he was eighteen. Three years later he joined the army to fight in the Spanish-American War. When he returned home a year later, he became a postman. There was nothing in his past job experience that qualified him, in reform terms, to run for Marshall of Berkeley (Carte, G. E. and Carte, E. H., 1975). Richard Sylvester had been a journalist and then a clerk with the District of Columbia Police. While in that position he wrote a book on the history of the Washington police. That got him noticed. He was promoted to major and then appointed superintendent of the District of Columbia Police. Sylvester went on to be named president of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), which he headed for the next 16 years (Walker, 1977). The IACP was in the forefront of policing leading the way to professionalism of policing.

The military analogy also offered a new vision of crime. According to this model, the city was a metaphor for the nation, and the police became the urban equivalent of the national armed forces, with the uniformed branch and the detective division acting as the two main arms of the service. It implied that all tactics were on the table in this all-out fight against the assault on the American way of life, implying that this “war” was apolitical and objective in its stance for justice. Politicians and media representatives often are so caught up in the single-minded slogans of “War on Crime”, the “thin blue line,” and so forth, that they are not prepared (whether
intentionally or not) to hear about the real world of policing. The military model held sway and flourished from the end of World War I through the 1920s (Fogelson, 1977). With this model in mind, reformers recruited retired and even active military men to run the police. Among them were Generals Francis V. Green, Theodore Roosevelt, and Theodore A. Bingham in New York, General Smedley D. Butler in Philadelphia, Colonel James W. Everington in Los Angeles, and Major Metellus L. C. Funkhouser in Chicago (Fogelson, 1977).

Many municipalities began using military rhetoric. Patrolmen became soldiers; superior officers, commanding officers; and police training became basic training. Criminals became state enemies, while lawyers were seen as diplomats. Americans were considered non-military combatants, and all of America became a battlefield. Some cities began calling patrolmen “privates,” rounds men, “sergeants,” and higher officers “lieutenants,” “captains,” “majors,” and “colonels” (Fogelson, 1977). Marine General Smedley Butler, as Head of Public Safety, equated the Philadelphia police with marines; “bandits” as enemies of the state; and high arrest rates as the main way to thwart crime. He and the Philadelphia police, he said, were “waging war” to keep Philadelphians free Philadelphia Evening Bulletin (PEB), January 20, 24, and (1924).

Police uniforms, originally just meant to help people distinguish police from others, were now designed to resemble those of the armed forces, Butler was the first Head of Public Safety of Philadelphia to wear a police uniform; his predecessors had not. Most uniforms are dark in color, with matching shirts and pants. There are variations for different conditions, such as a bicycle patrol officers wearing shorts in warm weather or officers wearing customized jackets and hats in colder climates. There are even formal hats that are worn on special occasions, such as a funeral or memorial service. It is critical that a police officer wear his or her assigned
uniform properly in order to be recognizable in case law enforcement services are needed. The main purpose of the police uniform is to command respect from the public while emphasizing the presence of justice when confronted by potential law breakers.

A major problem with the military model, however, was that it did not reduce corruption, incompetence and lawlessness of the police. Police administrations’ limited ability to shape police street practice persists despite managements preoccupation with control— an orientation that largely grew out of efforts to minimize the kinds of corruption, especially political corruption, that plagued late 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} century American policing.\textsuperscript{3} This has several unintended consequences. First, Americans became sympathetic to criminals and hostile to the police, not supporting their war on crime. Second, Fogelson (1977) writes there was constant criticism by the media, which portrayed the police as unlawful, corrupt, and incompetent. The result was that the police felt themselves removed from the civilians they were supposed to be protecting.

\textbf{The Professional Model}

A second group of police reformers emerged in response to growing dissatisfaction with the military model. While the first group had been interested in police reform as part of urban reform, this new second group was interested in police reform as a way of increasing police prestige. In terms of class and ethnicity, this second group was more heterogeneous that the first. But in at least one way the members of this second group were alike. With a few exceptions, Fogelson (1977) writes, they all came from the law enforcement community, and worked their

\textsuperscript{3} This does not imply that there were no other reasons for police managers’ concerns for control. Military organizations predisposed police toward command and control issues, and the inherent decentralization that goes with patrolling requires that considerable effort be put into establishing control mechanisms.
way up through the ranks. A majority, including O. W. Wilson, William H. Parker, Patrick V. Murphy, Lewis J. Valentine, Charles R. Gain, Thomas J. Gibbons, Stanley R. Schrotel, and Stephen P. Kennedy began as patrolmen. A large minority, among them Eliot Ness, Virgil W. Peterson, Quinn Tamm, Clarence M. Kelley, and Lear B. Reed started as FBI agents. Thus, while the first waves of reformers were often part of the upper-middle class, often professionals and not from law enforcement, the second was dominated by men who came out of law enforcement. As Walker (1977) wrote, “police work was able to produce its own experts.”

These police reformers developed a new definition of the police role, that of crime fighter (Fogelson 1977; and Walker 1977). This was similar to the military model, and helped to preempt it. Although very little of a policeman’s job was actually involved in crime fight, this second wave of reformers came to regard it as the most important police function. Police work, focuses primarily on the mundane aspects of policing, such as resolving conflicts, assisting and protecting children, managing drunks and the emotionally disturbed – those activities that fill patrol officers’ occupational lives. Among the proponents of this view were practitioners, August Vollmer, O.W. Wilson, Mike Murphy, Bill Parker and Patrick Murphy. Thus progress in the field of policing became measured primarily in terms of crime prevention (Carte, G. E. and Carte, E. H., 1975; Douthit 1991; and Fogelson 1977). From 1910 through 1960 the professional

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4 Vollmer did not work his way up through the ranks. His career began in Berkeley, CA in 1905 with his election to the office of marshall. He was re-elected in 1907. When the Berkeley charter was refashioned in 1909, the elected office of marshall was changed into the appointive office of chief of police. Vollmer remained as chief until 1932, except for a 1 year stint as chief of the LAPD. He was never a patrol officer (Carte and Carte 1975, pp. 18-21, 58).

5 It is important not to regard the two reform movements as rigidly split between Progressives and law enforcers. One major law enforcement figure, August Vollmer, for example, had supported the reform movement before 1930.
model was dominant. The Military and Professional models of policing refer to all policing agencies in America.

Three Eras of Policing

The history of American policing can be divided into three eras Hartmann (1988) each distinguishable from the others by the relative dominance of a particular administrative approach to police operations. The first period, the political era, was characterized by close ties between police and public officials. It began in the 1840s and ended around 1930. Throughout the period, American police agencies tended to serve the interests of powerful politicians and their cronies, providing the public-order-maintenance services almost as an afterthought. The second period, the reform era, began in the 1930s and lasted until the 1970s and was characterized by pride in professional crime fighting. Police departments during this period focused most of their resources on solving “traditional” crimes, such as murder, rape, and burglary, and on capturing offenders. The final and still developing era is community problem solving, an approach to policing that stresses the service role of police officers and envisions a partnership between police agencies and their communities.

The influence of each historical phase survives today in what James.Q. Wilson (1968) calls “policing styles,” A style of policing describes how a particular agency sees its purpose and chooses the methods it uses to fulfill that purpose. Wilson’s three policing styles – which he did not link to any particular historical era – are:

1. The watchman and (characteristic of the political era).
2. The legalistic (professional crime fighting of the reform era), and
3. The service (which is becoming more common today).

These three styles characterize nearly all municipal law enforcement agencies now operating in the United States, although some departments are a mixture of two or more styles. Policing in America has been defined largely by eras.

Kelling and Moore (1988) have suggested that there are three distinct eras of change in policing: the political era, the reform era and the community policing era. Skolnick and Bayley (1988) offer a slightly different, but complementary view, suggesting that a study of police change must focus on two models, the bureaucratic model and the community oriented policing model. In A Critical History of Police Reform, Walker (1977) notes countless examples of successful organizational change in police history that have led to greater accountability. In both his and Fogelson’s (1977) study of police history, focus is on the reform era, which they view as being instituted by citizen dissatisfaction with political corruption and poor quality of urban life at the turn of the century. The change in policing became part of a national reform movement in America during the Progressive Era, (Trojanowicz and Banas, 1985).

The Political Era/ Watchman

The political era, so named because of the close ties between police and politics, dated from the introduction of police municipalities during the 1840s, continued through the Progressive Period, and ended during the early 1900s, (Zhao, 1996). To understand just how strongly the patronage system controlled the police during that period, it is instructive to note that, in many cases, the police were employed as an instrument of the dominant political party, (Fosdick, 1920). Furthermore, police uniforms and their beginnings in the distinctive clothing
worn by the police to identify their source of patronage. In Philadelphia, for example, officers in one ward wore a specific type of hat while those in another ward wore a specific suit that connected each of them to their political affiliates (Allison and Penrose, 1887). During this period the police were dominated by corruption and political control. The police themselves were involved in criminal activities on a daily basis under the protection of their political bosses. Theft, drunkenness, and extortion of money from prisoners are examples of the crimes committed by the police officers, whose primary role was to keep the dominant political party in power (Pursley, 1984).

**The Professional Reform Era/ Legalistic**

The subsequent change to the Reform Era of policing resulted not from internal forces, but from a national movement to eliminate corruption from government. Although it is not possible to examine all the features of municipal reform and their interrelationships, such characteristics as the adoption of civil service systems; nomination by petition; initiative, recall, and referendum; the short ballot; the council-manager form of government; non-partisan elections; and certain sociological and demographic phenomena have brought significant changes to city governance and, as direct consequence, to municipal police services.

The reform strategy developed in reaction to the political. It took hold during the 1930s, thrived during the 1950s and 1960s, began to erode during the 1970s, and arguably, gave way to the community strategy during the early and mid-1980s. Both scholars and practitioners of American policing seem to agree that substantial organizational change during the first half of
the century transformed the police from a political machine-controlled force into a paramilitary and bureaucratic model (Zhao, 1996).

These changes were concurrent with the scientific management principals proposed by Frederick Taylor emphasizing workplace efficiency, span of control, unity of command, and standardized workplace practices. The police reforms that occurred at this time changed the focus of policing from a political patronage to a professional, crime control model. As Bucqueroux and Trojanowicz (1990) discuss, “The police reform movement launched by Vollmer in the 1920s, which took hold in the 1930s, seemed to offer the promise that society was on the brink of solving the riddle of crime. Police departments were now increasingly insulated from the political pressures that had spawned a variety of abuses, and they were organized according to the principals of scientific management theory, which promised increased efficiency and effectiveness” (p. 61). A small crack in the police armor appeared during the 1950s when some community members began to voice concerns about isolationism from the police who were there to protect them. Police agencies responded to this concern with the development of community relations units. This worked well for a while and the bureaucratic, crime control, professional model of policing seemed to be the wave of the future until the turbulent 1960s.

What began as a decade of hope under a new young President John F. Kennedy ended with a spiraling crime rates, civil unrest, anti-war demonstrations and race riots throughout America. A loose coalition of radical groups known as the New Left began calling police officer “pigs” and viewed them as brutal agents of establishment oppression. As talk of revolution rang out, the militant Black Power movement, which included such groups as the Black Panthers, became involved in a series of bloody clashes with the police. Black Panther member Eldridge
Cleaver declared, “…a dead pig is the best pig of all. We encourage people to kill them because they constitute an Army” (Heath, 1976, p.172). This general attitude toward the police was expressed by another Black Panther member: In our 400 – year struggle for survival, it has been the guns and force manifested in the racist pig…cops that occupy our communities that directly oppress, repress, brutalize, and murder us…So…when a self-defense group moves against this oppressive system, by executing a pig by any means, ….sniping, stabbing, bombing, etc., in defense against the 400 years of racist brutality and murder, this …can only be defined correctly as self-defense (Hewitt, 2003).

**The Community Policing Era/ Service**

The social unrest of the 1960s and 1970s was so great that it generated four separate presidential commissions within a five- year period to study the problem (President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice 1965; National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorder 1967; National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence 1968; President’s Commission on Campus Unrest 1970), (Tafoya, 1983). Fear of crime became a major public issue in the United States during the 1960s and, by 1970, public opinion polls revealed that crime was viewed as the most serious social problem in America surpassing racial conflict, inflation, and even the Vietnam War. Thus, the model that was designed to control crime was failing. The Isolation between the police and the communities they served contributed to this failing and led to the *community policing era*.

Robert D. Pursley (1984) wrote, traditionally, the police have been very slow to change. When change has occurred, it has usually …been brought about by such external forces as the
courts or reform groups rather than by the police…themselves (p. 226). Although these outside influences have brought about many needed reforms in the police service, such changes, because they are externally rather than internally induced, have too…often been temporary in nature. As a result, once external pressures relaxed, change had a tendency…to decelerate rapidly. Pursley (1984) went on to note that many of the changes in policing involved the use of technological innovations such as automobiles and two-way radios that were superimposed on old traditions, practices, and philosophies. In a more recent study, Zhao (1996) suggested that alterations in police organizations have occurred primarily as a result of forced adaptation to the external environment. These adaptations, he implies, do not represent significant changes in organizational domains or structures.

Probably more books have been written and research studies conducted on the topic of community policing than all other police topics combined. Community policing represents a model of policing that “…has evolved from a few small foot patrol studies to the preeminent reform agenda of modern policing. With roots in such earlier developments as police-community relations, team policing, crime prevention, and the rediscovery of foot patrol, community policing has become, in the 1990s, the dominant strategy of policing – so much so that the 1000,000 new police officers funded by the 1994 Crime Bill must be engaged, by law, in community policing” (Dunham and Alpert, 2001, p. 493). Community policing concepts are in contrast to the precepts of the Reform Era crime control model of policing. “The two models represent differing sets of values and beliefs, differing key organizational structures and essential operational activities. Both models have their advocates and critics, and both models’ advocates can point to successes with their preferred approach and failures with the other approach” (Zhao,
Of the two policing models, the community policing model represents a concept that is more complex and difficult to grasp. There are four primary reasons for this:

- **Programmatic Complexity** – Police departments throughout the country have instituted a countless variety of programs and practices under the heading of community policing. There is no single definition or model.

- **Multiple Effects** – There is no specific intended effect that is presumed to result from community policing practices. For example, some say it is to reduce crime, while others say it is to create a closer bond with the community.

- **Variation in Program Scope** – Community policing may involve a wide variety of programs or specialty units that have no bearing on department-wide practices.

- **Research Design Limitations** – The countless studies that have been completed on the effects of community policing lack credibility due to the short-term nature of these studies and lack of any real control groups (Dunham and Alpert, 2001).

Thus, it is very difficult to give a specific definition of community policing, much less identify the effectiveness of its practices and how well the concepts are being implemented in any given agency. As Dunham and Alpert (2001, p.494) reference Gary Cordner notes, “Community policing remains many things to many people.” A common refrain among proponents is ‘Community policing is a philosophy, not a program.’ An equally common refrain among police officers is, ‘Just tell me what you want me to do differently.’ Some critics, echoing concerns similar to those expressed by police officers, argue that if community policing is nothing more than a philosophy, it is merely an empty shell” (p. 494). 

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Bonnie Bucqueroux and Robert Trojanowicz (1990) view community policing as:

“...the first major reform in police departments since police departments embraced scientific management principles more than a half – century ago. It’s a dramatic change how police departments interact with the public; a new philosophy that broadens the police mission from a narrow focus on crime to a mandate that encourages police can explore creative solutions for community concerns, including crime, fear of crime, disorder, and neighborhood decay. Community Policing, the belief that only by working together the people and police can improve the quality of life in the community, with the police not only as enforcers, but also as advisors, facilitators, and supporters of new community – based, police supervised initiatives” (p. 3).

A simpler definition has been offered by the Community Policing Consortium. They define community policing as, “…a collaborative effort between the police and the community that identifies problems of crime and disorder and involves all elements of the community in search of the solutions to these problems” (Fridell and Wycoff, 2004, p. 3).

Many police executives in America have tried to implement community-policing philosophies by creating programs such as foot patrol or bicycle patrol. In doing so, they have failed to truly institutionalize this model in their agencies. Of course, this renders illusive any true measure of the effectiveness of its practices. In fact, “Nearly all of the evaluations conducted to date have focused on the tactical dimension of community policing, leaving us with

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6 The Community Policing Consortium was created by the Bureau of Justice Assistance and is comprised of representatives from the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the National Sheriff’s Association, the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives, the Police Executive Research Forum, and the Police Foundation
little or no information on the effects of philosophical, strategic, and organizational changes” (Dunham and Alpert, 2001, p. 507). It has been suggested by some that community policing represents an appropriate model to confront the homeland security issues posed by terrorism. For example, Matthew C. Scheider and Robert Chapman (2004) have stated that principles behind community policing – organizational change, problem solving, and external partnerships – enable police agencies to better deal with the threat of terrorist events and the fear they may create. However, not everyone agrees that community policing and homeland security are complementary. What is homeland security? Homeland security is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur (Bush, 2002).

Willard M. Oliver (2004) an associate professor of criminal justice at Sam Houston State University, wrote an article titled, “The Homeland Security Juggernaut: The End of the Community Policing Era?” In his article, he argues that the attacks of September 11, 2001, have ushered in a new era as community policing concepts and homeland security needs are simply inconsistent. “…Whether we like it or not, it is time to brace for a new era of policing, the era of Homeland Security” (Oliver, 2004, p. 10). Seattle Police Chief Gil Kerlikowske (2004) also sees an end to the Community Policing Era, but for different reasons. Acknowledging that community policing has made significant contributions to the law enforcement profession, the post 9/11 era has brought about decreasing revenues and increasing crime which have signaled the end of community policing in America. In a similar fashion, Darrel Stephens, Chief of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department stated, following the tragic events of September 11, 2001, homeland security has emerged as a top national priority….The sagging economy has
reduced revenue streams at every level of government and has further depleted funding for criminal justice. Very few states do not have significant deficits that require increased taxes, reductions in expenditures, or both. These conditions create additional challenges to sustaining community problem-oriented policing. One thing is clear. The fragmented and disjointed manner in which police agencies have attempted to transition into the era of community policing was ineffective in preparing America’s local law enforcement agencies to handle the homeland security threat posed by terrorism on September 11, 2001. The extraordinary thing about the attack on that day was that the 19 terrorists “…we’re preparing for their mission for months, leading normal lives with wives, taking the garbage out, taking their kids to McDonalds, taking flying lessons, living in comparatively pleasant places, all the while knowing that at some future date they were going to kill themselves and thousands of other people” (Hewitt, 2003).

The history of policing in America has been defined largely by three eras: the Political Era, the Professional Era, and the Community Era. Each of these periods carries with it its own set of characteristic ideologies or guiding philosophies (Henry, 2003). Henry also argues that for policing as an institution, as well as for individual agencies, the guiding philosophy of each era defines overall missions and goals, determines the kind of policies and practices that are developed, and generally shapes the way departments are organized and managed. The tragic events of September 11th, and the counter-terrorism prevention strategies that followed, have overwhelmingly shaped the structure, policies, and practices of policing organizations nationwide, thereby thrusting policing into a contemporary age. In his article *The Era of Homeland Security: September 11, 2001, to …* Oliver (2005) argues this point by adapting the research of (Kelling and Moore, 1988). Kelling and Moore scrutinized police organizational
strategies in seven topic elements – authorization, function, organization, demand, environment, tactics, and outcomes – in order to differentiate the evolution of policing throughout American history. Table 1.2 reflects Oliver’s adaptation of Kelling and Moore’s work to include the homeland security era of policing.

Table 1.2
The Four Eras of Policing based upon Organizational 1 Strategy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements</th>
<th>Political Era</th>
<th>Professional Era</th>
<th>Community Era</th>
<th>Homeland Security Era</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorization</td>
<td>Politics and law</td>
<td>Law and professionalism</td>
<td>Community support (political), law,</td>
<td>National/International threats (politics), law (intergovernmental), professionalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function</td>
<td>Broad social services</td>
<td>Crime control</td>
<td>Broad, provision of service</td>
<td>Crime control, antiterrorism/counter-terrorism, intelligence gathering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Design</td>
<td>Decentralized</td>
<td>Centralized, classical</td>
<td>Decentralized, task forces, matrices</td>
<td>Centralized decision-making, decentralized execution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship to Environment</td>
<td>Intimate</td>
<td>Professionally remote</td>
<td>Intimate</td>
<td>Professional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand</td>
<td>Decentralized, to patrol and politicians</td>
<td>Centralized</td>
<td>Decentralized</td>
<td>Centralized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactics and Technology</td>
<td>Foot patrol</td>
<td>Preventive patrol and rapid response to calls for service</td>
<td>Foot patrol, problem solving, etc.</td>
<td>Risk assessment, police operations centers, information systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Citizen political satisfaction</td>
<td>Crime control</td>
<td>Quality of life and citizen satisfaction</td>
<td>Citizen safety, crime control, anti-terrorism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.2 shows that policing has been said to have gone through three eras: the political, reform, and community; and consists of four different models of policing: traditional, community policing, problem-oriented and zero-tolerance. With the tragic events of 11 September 2001, and the government's movement toward enhanced domestic security, the author argues that we have entered a new era in American policing and are witnessing the adaptation of a new style of policing, namely Homeland Security. As Table 1.2 shows that policing as an institution, as well as for individual agencies, the guiding philosophy of each era defines overall missions and goals, determines the kind of policies and practices that are developed, and generally shapes the way departments are organized and managed. The tragic events of September 11th, and the counter-terrorism prevention strategies that followed, have overwhelmingly shaped the structure, policies, and practices of policing organizations nationwide, thereby thrusting policing into a contemporary age.

Shortly after the terrorist attacks, in a landmark decision President Bush (2002) established an Office of Homeland Security within the White House, signaling the Government’s important mission of protecting the homeland from future assaults. One of the first orders of business for this new office was to produce a strategic document that would rally the nation’s efforts from federal, state, local, and the private – sector agencies toward a mission of homeland security. By delineating three strategic objectives of homeland security in order of priority, the intent was to channel the energy and commitment in support of the national and [future] local strategies. The three objectives are:

- Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States;
- Reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism; and
- Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur,

Collectively, these objectives steer law enforcement organizations when dedicating resources needed to avert terrorism and the consequences associated with attacks.

The National Strategy for Homeland Security has provided police a mandate for defending our nations in this new era. It has essentially embodied a new spirit in American policing, by articulating a new philosophy intended to generate innovation and organizational change among police organizations. Advancing these creative changes will undoubtedly affect long and short-term operations and radically alter existing organizational structures.

Mostly all of the existing works on police history in America have been studies of large urban departments. These studies have contributed important knowledge about the response of particular urban communities to the problems of social control. Similar studies of other cities are needed if we are to build a sound historical understanding of policing in America. Research into the historical development and context of the state police broadens the scope of police history in rural America, which is the topic of the next chapter.
In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, while our nation struggled to grasp the asymmetric threat that exposed our domestic flank, homeland security became a recognizable neologism throughout the United States. Although the phrase implies several connotations that include a national strategy, a department in our federal government, and, most importantly, a guiding philosophy that defines organizational missions and goals to determine policies and practices, it has fueled a debate involving the states and the federal government. At the core of this debate are the three significant guiding principles of the American government: federalism, Posse Comitatus, and the Tenth Amendment, each of which have implications for advancing the primary role of state and local law enforcement in defending the homeland.

In essence, federalism is a system of decentralized power delegated to the states under the Constitution to keep the federal government from becoming a tyrannical body. During the period between 1787 and 1788, the author known only as “Publius” began writing a series of articles in The New-York Journal. The articles, 85 in total, known as “The Federalist Papers,” were intent on stirring the emotions of the public and the constitutional convention members. The real authors – John Jay, James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton – envisaged that their writings would promote support for ratifying the proposed Constitution. They were indeed correct for today, over 200 years later; these writings uphold the underpinnings of the American tradition of federalism grounded in the United States Constitution.
In Federalist #45, Publius described, “The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people; and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State” (Anonymous, 1961, p. 328). The passage describes the authority, promulgated under the Constitution, for entrusting the states with the local duty of public health, safety, emergency management, and law enforcement (O’Connor, 2005). Perhaps, then, it is the tradition of federalism itself that seats state governments as the principal element in our homeland security.

However, several noted national security experts argue that since terrorists from foreign countries pose the greatest threat to our homeland security, it is the military that should take up arms and provide for our common defense. As O’Connor (2005) points out, the common defense is the federal government’s responsibility stemming from the Preamble to the Constitution: “…to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.” However, as was the case with the September 11 hijackers who carried out their covert operations inside our domestic borders, terrorists operating in the United States are outside the range of our military because the Posse Comitatus Act forbids them from carrying out domestic law enforcement. As with federalism, Posse Comitatus may place at least part of the responsibility for homeland security squarely on the shoulders of the states that are entrusted with dispensing local law enforcement.

Moreover, the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution ensures that states can exercise sovereignty from the federal government in producing state initiatives. Also called the Police Powers Amendment, the Tenth Amendment reads, “The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people” (Mount, 2006). Is Homeland Security a state initiative protected by the Tenth Amendment? Even so, the trend that underscores homeland security efforts today focus on prevention and preemption. Interestingly enough, that terminology is consistent with a mission of law enforcement rather than one of National Security, which preserves a global presence of engagement and containment (O’Connor, 2005).

Does it matter then that in defining Homeland Security there is much debate over who is responsible for it? Perhaps. O’Connor (2005) cites a two-sided debate involving the states and the federal government over the significance of homeland security. He adds that, on one side, homeland security is seen by the states as a local issue incorporating counter-terrorism initiatives into existing all-hazards strategies. He considers this a bottom-up approach to homeland security. In contrast, proponents for federal centralization of homeland security speak for “a seamless integrated system that protects all citizens.” The argument is that state governments are extremely limited in their capacities for handling terrorist attacks. O’Connor (2005) labels this the top-down approach to homeland security in that it requires federal standards to ensure best practices for homeland security.

An advocate of the top-down approach may argue the President’s National Strategy for Homeland Security is a federal standard that mandates best practices and can be located in the DHS. The strategy defines its mission as mobilizing and organizing the nation to secure the homeland from terrorist attacks by coordinating a focused effort from our entire society – the federal government, state and local governments, the private sector, and the American people (Bush, 2002, p. 1). Regardless of the side of the debate one chooses to promote, the national
strategy—divided into six critical mission areas—provides a useful framework for aligning security efforts and critical decision making at both the federal and state levels.

These areas include:

- **Intelligence and Warning**—Incorporates information collection and analysis techniques to detect and alert authorities of suspicious activity that, left unchecked, may lead to a terrorist event.

- **Border and Transportation Security**—Promotes innovative security initiatives that effectively and efficiently protect our borders and domestic transportation systems from the destructive objectives of terrorists.

- **Domestic Counter-terrorism**—Prioritizes the collective mission of federal, state, and local law enforcement towards preventing and interdicting terrorist activity.

- **Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets**—Focuses and improves efforts at securing the nation’s critical infrastructure components.

- **Defending against Catastrophic Threats**—Advances new approaches and strategies for preventing terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction.

- **Emergency Preparedness and Response**—Prepares and consolidates emergency response plans to ensure federal, state, local, and private sector organizations are equipped and trained for emergencies (Bush, 2002, p.viii).

Under the current debate, homeland security may seem amorphous to state law enforcement executives who may be weighing alternatives for adopting new policing strategies particularly when the approaches to homeland security in their respective regions may wax and wane depending on the entities involved. Yet, the fact remains that ensuring homeland security will rely on preemptive methods that develop the abilities of the police to detect and disrupt terrorists before they can strike (White, 2004).
Historical Overview of State Policing

The state police are primarily a twentieth century phenomenon with peak periods of emergence in the early 1920s (following WW I), Prohibition, and the Great Depression. State Police development offers an opportunity to study relationships between the changing social conditions and social control. Criticism of historical studies of the police noted their failure to examine evidence about the identities, motives and activities of the specific, vested interests engaged in creating the police. The creation of the state police was a legislative act that required the introduction and passage of specific pieces of legislation. Quenzel (1943) discussed the organization as well as the fight to establish a state police. This process makes it possible to identify the individuals, groups, political parties, and other vested interests working for, and against, passage of state police laws.

The state police emerged in America during the Progressive Era. Defined as the period from the late 1880’s to early 1920s, progressivism is characterized as a way of thinking and responding to the Nation’s problems at the turn of the century. The state police offered an excellent opportunity to study this process as it was a new form of policing in America. State police agencies are usually organized after one, of two, models. In the first, a centralized model, the tasks of major criminal investigations are combined with the patrol of state highways. The second state model, the decentralized model, draws a clear distinction between traffic enforcement on state highways and other state-level law enforcement functions by creating at least two separate agencies. This research explores the forces that were instrumental in the creation of state police agencies and the interest structure that best explains how the state police were created.
State law enforcement in the Twentieth century, beyond pushes for the professionalization of municipal police forces, the United States also saw the development of two unprecedented police institutions: The state police and the federal bureau of investigation. The state police forces came out of a desire to provide a heretofore unavailable urban service (police force) to less populated areas. These new institutions made for a complicated an un-systematized relationship between local, state, and national police forces that garnered criticisms even before it came to wide public attention by post September 11 confusions and accusations. The state police are only one component of the American policing system. The arguments concerning the birth of the state police will get us closer to understanding the evolution of the policing system in America.

In 1905, Pennsylvania became the first state to organize a non-political state police force along military lines especially for use in quelling labor riots during our “industrial revolution”. The great anthracite coal strike by 1902 in northeastern Pennsylvania covered seven counties and lasted five months. It created enormous difficulties because state authorities were forced to take National Guardsmen away from their business employment and professions for extended periods (The Anthracite Coal Strike Commission, 1903, p. 1-3).

The size of the Pennsylvania force was 228 in 1905 (Pennsylvania State Legislature, Session Laws, 1905, no.227). The troops were selected by a superintendent who, although appointed by the governor, was completely autonomous in running the department. The men were housed in barracks and were to constantly patrol the rural sections of the state. They were given total police power to serve all warrants, arrest without warrant all witnessed law violators, and preserve law and order through the State (Pennsylvania State Legislature, 1905).
The New York State Police in 1917 consisting of 232 men and officers had only one restriction placed on the force and that was that they could not be used to suppress riots in cities without approval of the Governor (New York State Legislature, 1917).

Even today there is not a clearly defined role for police in America. Before the advent of car patrols, the beat officer was closely associated to the people and usually considered a friend as a result of close personal contact. The loss of personal touch with people is emphasized by the fact that today the police officer is known usually when he or she responds to a complaint or is issuing a citation: both negative connotations in most cases. The macho antics of television and movie police did not engender good will with the public since those usually were negative characterizations as well. Table 2.1 contains a list of the states indicating the type of law enforcement agency created and the year in which they were established.

Table 2.1
State Police Departments Agency Type and Date Established\(^7\).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Type of Agency</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>Special Force</td>
<td>1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Special Force</td>
<td>1920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State Highway Patrol*</td>
<td>1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>Highway Patrol*</td>
<td>1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Territorial Police</td>
<td>1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>Rangers</td>
<td>1901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rangers</td>
<td>1903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Highway Patrol*</td>
<td>1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>State Road Patrol*</td>
<td>1929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State Police</td>
<td>1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>Highway Patrol*</td>
<td>1929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>Department of Safety</td>
<td>1917</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^7\) Hawai‘i’s state policing authority is the Sheriff Division within the Department of Public Safety. The Sheriff Division carries out law enforcement services statewide, including Honolulu International Airport.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Police Force</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>Highway Courtesy Patrol</td>
<td>1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>County Detectives</td>
<td>1891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State Detectives</td>
<td>1898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Traffic Officers</td>
<td>1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>Dept. of Public Safety*</td>
<td>1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Home Guard</td>
<td>1917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dept. of Public Safety*</td>
<td>1937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>No state police; each island has its own police force.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>State Constabulary</td>
<td>1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State Police</td>
<td>1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>Highway Patrol Officers*</td>
<td>1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Highway Maintenance Police</td>
<td>1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>Deputies*</td>
<td>1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State Police</td>
<td>1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>Special Agents</td>
<td>1915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Highway Safety Patrol</td>
<td>1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>Inspectors*</td>
<td>1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Highway Patrol</td>
<td>1937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>Highway Patrol*</td>
<td>1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State Police</td>
<td>1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>Highway Police*</td>
<td>1928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Highway Patrol</td>
<td>1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State Police</td>
<td>1936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>Special Constables</td>
<td>1917</td>
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<td></td>
<td>State Highway Police*</td>
<td>1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>Motorcycle Deputies*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>1935</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State Detective Force</td>
<td>1875</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>District Police</td>
<td>1879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Dept. of Public Safety</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1917</td>
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<td></td>
<td>State Police</td>
<td>1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1938</td>
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<td>Missouri</td>
<td>Highway Patrol</td>
<td>1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>Highway Patrol*</td>
<td>1935</td>
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<td>Special Assistants</td>
<td>1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Law Enforcement Dept.</td>
<td>1927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Highway Safety Patrol*</td>
<td>1937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>State Police</td>
<td>1908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
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<td>1937</td>
</tr>
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<td>New Jersey</td>
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<td>1921</td>
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<td>Mounted Police</td>
<td>1905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Motor Patrol</td>
<td>1933</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(Bechtel, K. H., 1995, pp. 32-33). State Police in the United States, A Socio-Historical Analysis

1.

The above Table 2.1 shows the process of state police development in the United States began with a long period of slow and gradual emergence via individual experimentation by a few states, continued with a period of quickened activity which focused on the constabulary model of policing, and ended with a period of redirection during the thirties, with the focus on traffic control.
These organizations, with 56,348 members, represent approximately 7 percent of the total law enforcement officers nationwide according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS, 2004). In contrast, local police account for 56% of the total number with 440,920 members nationwide (BJS, 2005). This may explain why a considerable amount of empirical research has focused more on local policing efforts reflective of city police departments involved in crime control strategies and counter-terrorism strategies than on the operations of state police organizations. Historical data and literature on states’ operational roles and activities related to terrorism are also virtually nonexistent according to The Council of State Governments (CSG) and Eastern Kentucky University (EKU), (2003, p.11). When it comes to state police organizations, there is a lack of parity in research.

Breaking from the contemporary research pattern, this research will explore policing strategies aimed directly at the state level. It will examine the policy options that state police organizations can adopt when choosing a policing strategy for providing homeland security to their constituents. It is true that September 11, 2001 has affected all police agencies; however, because state police entities are filling the gaps and vacuums created by new roles and changes in policing conditions, it is paramount that research provides these organizations with an avenue worth modeling.

As, Wroblewski and Hess (1993) discuss that every state except Hawaii has some form of state police agency. Most state police agencies were created the late nineteenth or early twentieth century to meet specific needs. The Texas Rangers, created in 1835 before Texas attained statehood, apprehension of Mexican cattle rustlers was one of the main concerns. Massachusetts, targeting vice control, was the second state to create a law enforcement agency.
Today, a wide diversity of state policing agencies exists, such as Highway patrol, State Police, State bureaus of Investigation, Fish and wildlife agencies, State park services, Weigh station operations Alcohol law enforcement agencies, State university police and Port authorities.

A reason for the limited information and lack of research attention given to the state police may be their perceived role in the policing system. When people think of the police, they think of the police in their town, village or the larger urban forces in New York, Los Angeles or Chicago, Houston, Philadelphia, and Detroit. Local law enforcement is seen as the first line of defense against crime and social disorder.

Local law enforcement organizations are usually the largest, most professional and most recognizable segments of local government. In addition a sizeable segment of the population holds the law enforcement community in high esteem and trusts law enforcement organizations. The public servants in our communities — America’s firefighters, law enforcement officers, emergency medical personnel, and a host of allied professionals, provide the first-line of defense and protection to our communities in times of crisis. Police and sheriffs’ officers across the country have long been the first line of defense for our communities against crimes of all sorts – ranging from petty theft and fraud to more heinous offenses like assault, rape, and murder. Since the 9/11 attacks, however, the demands placed on officers have evolved to include more complex criminal activity, upswings in multi-jurisdictional criminal matters, and an increased realization that terrorist activity is not confined by neat boundaries on a map.

As a September report by the U. S. Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Assistance, (2005) noted, “a critical lesson taken from the tragedy of September 11, 2001, is that
intelligence is everyone’s job,” and “everyone” now includes not only analysts within the federal government but also law enforcement officers hailing from the nation’s largest cities to its smallest towns and rural areas. In contrast, the common perception of the state policing is more mundane and service oriented. Unlike the crime fighting image of the city police, the state police bring to mind speed enforcement. Such an image, although fairly accurate in a superficial sense, overlooks the importance of the state police’s role in the history of policing in America. State law enforcement represents about 6 percent of total police employment in the United States (BJS, 2008). In keeping with this employment level, state law enforcement has traditionally played an important, but relatively small role in the overall picture of policing in America……until 9/11.

**Funding**

Following the terrorists attacks on September 11, 2001, Americans generally assumed that authorities in Washington, D. C., would shoulder the primary responsibility for securing the safety of the American homeland. This assumption is understandable given that over the past half century the federal government has amassed far more authority than was ever envisioned in the U. S. Constitution. Despite a rich history of civilian defense in which states and localities have taken responsibility for their own affairs, we are federalizing more and more of the homeland security mission.

This approach is not only constitutionally incorrect, but the states themselves could actually do the job better. Washington’s one-size fits-all solutions rarely succeed. The country’s needs are too diverse, federal resources are physically too far from any one location to secure rapid response, and federal decision making is notoriously inept.
States cannot depend upon the federal government to honor their commitments to fund homeland security initiatives at the state and local level. This is evidenced by the steady decline in funding for state and local initiatives over the past several federal fiscal years (FY). There are seven homeland security grant programs: Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI); State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP); Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP); Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS); Citizen Corps Program (CCP); Critical Infrastructure Protection Program (CIP) and Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG). This research focuses on the four programs that have been most beneficial to rural states: SHSGP; LETPP; UASI; and EMPG.

Three of the four programs, SHSGP, LETPP and EMPG, were funded pursuant to the provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act, which set a minimum allocation to states of 0.75 percent of the total amount appropriated in the fiscal year for grants. According to the Congressional Research Service (2006), the Administration’s request to shift funding from SHSGP and UASI to LETPP in FFY08 could result in fewer funds being available to the states Lake and Nunez-Neto Department of Homeland Security (DHS, 2007).

As early as 2004, it was apparent the federal funding mechanism was not working well. Local units of government were required to spend their own funds and wait for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to reimburse them. Cities complained the appropriate level of funding was not being realized by local units of government. The problem was created in part by federal bureaucracy and in part by state bureaucracy.

Beyond the reduction of federal funding for grant programs, states are still dependent upon the federal government to provide homeland security funds for state and local projects.
In FY06, 21 states depended upon the federal government for 100 percent of their homeland security funding, 17 were between 75 and 99 percent, three were between 50 and 74 percent, five were less than 50 percent and only one relied totally upon state funding National Emergency Management Association (NEMA, 2006). For FY07, 20 states depended upon the federal government for 100 percent of their homeland security funding, 15 were between 75 and 99 percent, eight were between 50 and 74 percent, four were between one and 49 percent and only three relied totally upon state funding (NEMA, 2007, p.10). Table 2.2 shows the dependence of the states on funding from the Federal Government for their homeland security.

Table 2.2

How State Homeland Security Office/Division/Departments Are Funded

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responding State</th>
<th>2006% Federal Grants</th>
<th>2006% State Funds</th>
<th>2006% Other</th>
<th>2007% Federal Grants</th>
<th>2007% State Funds</th>
<th>2007% Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>78</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
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<td>68</td>
<td>32</td>
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<td>80</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>90</td>
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<td>State</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>19.6</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>70</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td>Maryland</td>
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<td>Michigan</td>
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<td>61</td>
<td>96.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>75</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
<td>97.9</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>80</td>
<td>20</td>
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</tr>
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</table>
Table 2.2 appears to show an adoption of a philosophy geared toward high population areas and away from lower rural populations.

In its report dated January 5, 2007, *Overview: FY 2007 Homeland Security Grant Program*, DHS sounded a warning for all rural and low population states. It stated that the 2007 funding priorities improve DHS’s “primary commitment to risk-based funding” and went on to say it was committed to “assisting with regional planning and security coordination” (DHS, 2007, p.1). In “political speak” that appears to be an adoption of a philosophy geared toward high population areas and away from more rural jurisdictions. As a result, rural states need to develop a strategy that depends less upon the federal government and more upon themselves and their citizens, both individual and corporate.

**Funding Prior to 2007**

Federal funding of homeland security and disaster assistance is not new. In 1803, as a result of a fire that decimated Portsmouth, New Hampshire, the U.S. Congress adopted its first disaster relief legislation. Several other disasters were funded on an ad hoc basis. In 1929, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation became the first federal disaster response agency by dispensing federal disaster assistance. In 1950, Congress passed the Federal Civil Defense Act and funded federal and state civil defense programs. Notably, the act mandated that preparedness
was a joint responsibility of federal, state and local governments with federal monies funding the programs (NEMA, 2006, p. 8).

In 1979, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was created. By the late 1980s, state and local agencies were paying the bulk of the costs of disaster relief programs. In the 1990s, the Emergency Management Performance Grant program (EMPG) was created. As discussed below, funding for EMPG did not keep pace with demand. In making recommendations for the provision of homeland security, the 9/11 Commission stated:

Recommendation: “Hard choices must be made in allocating limited resources. The U.S. government should identify and evaluate the transportation assets that need to be protected, set risk-based priorities for defending them, select the most practical and cost-effective ways of doing so, and then develop a plan, budget, and funding to implement the effort.

The plan should assign roles and missions to the relevant authorities (federal, state, regional, and local) and to private stakeholders”. (9/11 report, p.406)\(^8\)

That recommendation, albeit directed at transportation, clearly set forth the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) philosophy and identified “regional” entities as relevant parties. “Regional” parties are seldom mentioned in the funding discussion.

The seven homeland security grant programs, set forth below, have experienced a decline in funding from FY2003 through FY2006, as can be seen in Table 2.3 Maguire and Reese (2006).

---

Table 2.3

State Allocations Office of Grants /Training Homeland Security Grants
(all amounts in millions except dollar per capita figures)


Table 2.3 details the decline in funding for the State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) between 2003 and 2006 were 74.4 percent. Reductions for the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP) for the same period were 23.2 percent; Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) increased overall 19 percent, but some metropolitan areas actually experienced a per capita decline; Emergency Management Performance Grant Program (EMPG) increased 8.7 percent; Metropolitan Medical Response System MMRS) decreased 31.9 percent; and Citizen Corps Program (CCP) increased 2.2 percent. The Critical Infrastructure Protection Program CIP was only funded in 2003.
Funding Since 2007

What is new about federal funding is the basis upon which funds are disbursed. Funds are now being allocated based upon a risk assessment formula developed by the federal government. Beginning in FY2006, that assessment focused primarily upon population, which is a concern for rural states and communities that are not densely populated. Previously, for FY2002 through FY2007, the USA PATRIOT Act allocated each state not less than 0.75 percent of the total funds appropriated. The remainder was allocated to each state in direct proportion to the state’s percentage of the nation’s population.

The FY2007 and FY2008 appropriations and the requested FY2009 appropriations set forth in the following table project a continued funding decrease, albeit there was an increase in FY2008 funding. The original FY2008 Administration request for all state and local homeland security programs was $925 million less than Congress appropriated for FY2007 (Reese, 2007). Congress, however, funded more than the Administration requested. It should be noted there was no funding for LETPP, per se, in FY2008 or requested in FY2009. It was funded in FY2008 and is proposed to be funded in FY2009 from both SHSGP, and UASI Reese (2008). Table 2.4 illustrates the funding for the programs.

---

Table 2.4
State and Local Homeland Security Assistance Programs: FY2007 and FY2008 Appropriations and FY2009 Budget Authority Request ($000,000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>FY2007 Appropriation</th>
<th>FY2008 Appropriation</th>
<th>FY2009 Budget Request</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP)</td>
<td>$525</td>
<td>$950</td>
<td>$200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP)</td>
<td>$375</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Area security Initiative (UASI)</td>
<td>$770</td>
<td>$820</td>
<td>$825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG)</td>
<td>$200</td>
<td>$300</td>
<td>$200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1,870</strong></td>
<td><strong>$2,070</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1,225</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Listed in Table 2.4 are funds for three of the four programs – SHSGP, LETPP, and EMPG, are appropriated and allocated among the states in accord with the provisions of the USA Patriot Act. Which says that states are to use the grants in conjunction with units of local government, to enhance the capability of state and local jurisdictions to prepare for and respond to terrorist acts including events of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction and biological, nuclear, radiological, incendiary, chemical, and explosive devices.

The other program, UASI provides grants allocated to certain urban areas and metropolitan medical systems entirely at the discretion of DHS.

The Administration has proposed reducing funding in FY2009 on most state and local homeland security programs, except UASI and two others. Its proposal would amount to $2.0
billion less than the amount of the FY2008 Congressional appropriation.

Policing in the Homeland Security Era requires state police organizations that are responsible for a host of Homeland Security obligations, to integrate the proactive principles of intelligence to identify problems and then allocate their finite resources to address those problems both effectively and efficiently. The following chapter will discuss the restructuring of state policing in the Homeland Security Era, including the various state responses to September 11, 2001 (9/11) and a case study of the Illinois State Police (ISP).
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Chapter III
Restructuring of State Policing in the Homeland Security Era

Homeland security has significantly altered the face of our nations’ law enforcement efforts. Its effect on the organizational structure and functions of police agencies has transformed organizations, notably the state police and large urban police departments into armies with the capabilities of moving resources and personnel in the direction of the affected problem areas exposed by intelligence reporting. In the history of American policing nothing has advanced the “dialectical process of integrating diverse ideas and practices” into policing than the advent of homeland security (Henry, 2003, p. 73).

Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in a landmark decision President Bush established an Office of Homeland Security within the Executive Branch, signaling the government’s important mission of protecting the homeland from future assaults National Strategy for Homeland Security NSHS (2002). One of the first orders of business for this new office was to produce a strategic document that would rally the nation’s efforts from federal, state, local, and the private-sector agencies toward a mission of homeland security. By delineating three strategic objectives of homeland security in order of priority, the intent was to channel the energy and commitment in support of the national and future local strategies. The three objectives are:

- Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States;
- Reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism; and
• Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur, collectively, these objectives steer law enforcement organizations when dedicating resources needed to avert terrorism and the consequences associated with attacks NSHS (2002).

Because of their late emergence in the United States, state level police agencies have been hard pressed to claim primary or exclusive jurisdiction over specific policing and enforcement tasks and responsibilities or to claim the unquestioned right to police specific parcels of geography exclusively with the exception as a general rule of federal interstate highways. This is somewhat less true for highway patrol units than for state police agencies as highway patrol serve a well-defined and limited mission and function (i.e., highway safety and traffic enforcement) that is clearly outlined and does not diminish the previously established roles of municipal, county and special taxing district policing organizations.

The NSHS (2002) has provided police a mandate for defending the United States in this new era. It has essentially embodied a new spirit in American policing, by articulating a new philosophy intended to generate innovation and organizational change among police organizations. Advancing these creative changes will undoubtedly affect long and short-term operations and radically alter existing organizational structures. While it is true that all types of police agencies have been significantly affected post September 11, 2001 it seems that state law enforcement agencies have been affected the most. For state police organizations whose responsibilities extend well beyond the territorial boundaries of single communities and encompass large regional functional jurisdictions, the allocation of resources is a primary concern for daily and strategic operations.
Comparative Structures of State Policing

States have adopted two basic law enforcement structures: a unified structure usually with the label state police, state patrol or the department of public safety and a bifurcated structure, with a highway patrol and a separate bureau of criminal investigation. Hawaii is the only state that does not have a general-purpose state level law enforcement agency. In a unified system the same state agency performs patrol, traffic and criminal investigation responsibilities. Examples include the Illinois State Police (ISP) the case study of this research, the Nebraska State Patrol (NSP), and the Arizona Department of Public Safety (ADPS). In a bifurcated system one agency typically provides traffic enforcement and limited patrol services, while a separate agency investigates specific types of crimes. Florida for example, has the Florida Highway Patrol (FHP), and the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE). California has the California Highway Patrol (CHP) and the California Bureau of Investigation (CBI).

State police organizations in conjunction with highway patrol, and other duties that run the gamut from investigations to technical support, must balance resources needed to advance homeland security initiatives. The initiatives have had a considerable impact on state police. Graph 3.1 illustrates the contrast between state and local law enforcement organizations allocation of resources toward homeland security.
Graph 3.1

State versus local law enforcement

The following quote cited from the report by The Council of State Governments (CSG) and Eastern Kentucky University, provides a detailed explanation of Graph 3.1:

Source: CSG and EKU National Survey of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 2004 (State Law Enforcement Population = 73, Collected Surveys = 61; Local Law Enforcement Sample Size = 399; Collected Surveys = 186).

Graph 3.1 Allocation of Resources by State and Local Law Enforcement (The Council of State Governments (CSG) and Eastern Kentucky University (EKU) through support from the National Institute of Justice, The Impact of Terrorism on State Law Enforcement: Adjusting to New Roles and Changing Conditions Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, (2005, p. 18). Briefly summarize the figure.

The following quote cited from the report by The Council of State Governments (CSG) and Eastern Kentucky University, provides a detailed explanation of Graph 3.1:
“As indicated by the red bars, three quarters or more of all state level respondents indicated they allocated more resources to security for critical infrastructure, special events and dignitaries; intelligence gathering, analysis and sharing; and terrorism related investigations. Not reflected in this figure, state agencies were most likely to report fewer resources to drug enforcement and traditional criminal investigation. A majority of states, however, reported no change in allocation of resources for these two operation responsibilities.” (p. 19).

State agencies were more likely than local ones to report allocating more resources for most operational responsibilities, except for airport security, community policing, drug enforcement and investigation, traffic safety and traditional criminal investigation. Fewer than 22 percent of state and local agencies reported allocating additional resources to traffic safety and traditional criminal investigation. (CSG and EKU National Survey of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 2004). Although the patterns of resource allocation or reallocation since September 11, 2001 were similar among state and local agencies, there were notable differences.

- A greater percentage of state agencies reported the allocation of more resources to 10 to 15 comparable responsibilities, suggesting that these concerns have had a larger impact (as measured by allocation of more resources) on state agencies than on local ones.

- State agencies were substantially more likely than local agencies to report devoting more resources to border security; commercial vehicle enforcement; security for critical infrastructure; security for special events
and dignitaries; intelligence gathering, analysis and sharing; terrorism related investigations.

- Unlike state agencies, local ones did not report allocating substantially more resources for any operational responsibility since September 11, 2001. (CSG and EKU National Survey of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 2004).

After analyzing responses by the type of state agencies and size of local agencies, the most striking differences are found in responses of small and larger agencies. As with state agencies, relatively high percent of large local agencies reported allocating more resources to security for critical infrastructure, events and dignitaries, intelligence gathering, analysis and sharing; terrorism related investigations. Small local agencies were consistently less likely to report allocating more resources for various operational responsibilities (From: The Council of State Governments (CSG) and Eastern Kentucky University through support from the National Institute of Justice, The Impact of Terrorism on State Law Enforcement: Adjusting to New Roles and Changing Conditions Washington, D.C.:U.S. Department of Justice, (2005, p. 19).

The overall function and responsibilities in support of state law enforcement have transformed radically since September 11, 2001. Homeland security now dominates the missions of these law enforcement organizations. Table 3.1 illustrates the 2004 survey administered by the Council of State Governments (CSG) and Eastern Kentucky University (EKU).
As Table 3.1 indicates, more than 50 percent of state law enforcement agencies reported that their level of involvement was *a great amount* or *our agency is the leader* for seven of the 12 activities listed in the survey. State law enforcement agencies seem to be playing only a small role in distributing homeland security funds and in educating and training the public about homeland security.
The survey identified the percentage of state law enforcement agencies who reported sizeable contributions to their states homeland security initiatives. The assessment revealed that state law enforcement officers and investigators have seen increased responsibilities in the areas of investigating terrorist acts, responding to terrorist events, terrorism related intelligence gathering and conducting vulnerability assessments. The results also reported changes among state level officers and investigators duties and responsibilities to be more substantial than those of their local counterparts.

There were five case studies conducted by The Council of State Governments (CSG) and the Eastern Kentucky University, (2004) to document several different structures and models to address terrorism at the state level, with a particular focus on the different roles played by state law enforcement agencies and other criminal justice stakeholders. The following states were selected for the studies: Arizona, Florida, Nebraska, New York and Washington.

In summary, interviews were conducted with state, and local and federal officials, including the state police, homeland security officials, local police chiefs and sheriffs and special agents from the FBI and Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Project staff explored many different related to terrorism and homeland security, searching for common themes. Although states have many unique characteristics, similar issues and needs surfaced in a majority of the states. For example, all states were pursuing intelligence fusion centers and improved intelligence analysis capabilities. Nevertheless, states are developing fusion centers to help address their intelligence needs. There is consensus among the states that a huge need exists for intelligence analysts and improved analytical tools, in addition to funding.
Given the multidisciplinary nature of homeland security, new regional planning entities are being formed to assess the needs of all local stakeholders, including law enforcement, fire and public health providers. Many local jurisdictions in rural areas lack the resources and expertise needed to conduct comprehensive planning. Furthermore, there are simply not enough resources to supply every local jurisdiction with a full array of prevention and response equipment. For these and other reasons, states are turning to regions or zones as an alternative. States pursuing regional structures are adapting them to their unique needs and characteristics.

Homeland security is high on the national agenda. As pointed out in earlier chapters, the concept directly affects the way police organizations advance their missions. With the exception of large urban area police departments, the new practice of homeland security has hit state police organizations from across the nation the hardest. The Council of State Governments (CSG) and Eastern Kentucky University’s (2005), *The impact of Terrorism on State Law Enforcement* the enormity of homeland security on state law enforcement in their 50 – state survey of state and local law enforcement agencies. The impact, as seen in the new responsibilities and new undertakings, has changed the way these organizations function. In addition, some have relinquished older styles of policing for more innovative practices as means for confronting the challenges present in the homeland security milieu.

**Various State Responses**

**State Strengths and Weaknesses**

States indicated their programs greatest strengths, and areas in which improvement was needed, as well as areas that would benefit most from additional funding. Also, states indicated
were areas of homeland security and emergency response that would take precedence over other areas. Montana stressed its greatest capability is international counter-intelligence services. New Jersey indicated that one stop shopping with the homeland security branch is its greatest capability and that additional funding would greatly benefit its communications. Florida noted its emphasis on regional collaboration is one of its greatest areas of strength, and indicated additional funding to make regional and statewide fusion centers functional A Special Series Report of the Southern Legislative Conference (SLC), (CanagaRetna and Williams, 2008).

Michigan, noted its greatest strengths is its Regional Response Team structure. Regionalization, efforts are adding to the development of all-state capabilities. Additional funding would most benefit areas of interoperable communications, responder’s health and safety, and citizen preparedness (CanagaRetna and Williams, 2008, p. 47). Wisconsin’s greatest areas of strength lie in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive Weapons, (CBRNE) response; state’s infrastructure protection, public private partnerships. Wisconsin’s challenge going forward is sustaining programs (CanagaRetna and Williams, 2008, p. 48). These are only a few examples of the many innovative efforts states are making relative to homeland security and emergency management today.

**The Illinois State Police: A Case Study**

The rest of this chapter outlines the organizational changes the Illinois State Police (ISP) has under taken in response to the Homeland Security Era. Homeland security became recognizable neologism throughout the United States the phrase implies several connotations that include a national strategy, a department in our federal government, and, most importantly, a
guiding philosophy that defines organizational missions and goals to determine practices. This case study will provide an overview of the organizational and strategic changes in the ISP.

Consequently, the ISP, in recognizing the enormity of providing a blanket of homeland security to its constituents, has undertaken several strategic initiatives designed to ready it for the demands that will certainly continue. One project has been the reorganization of its Investigation Section to sustain the structures and processes involved with the paradigm of intelligence-led policing. This case study will provide an overview of the organizational changes and processes the ISP has implemented to support intelligence-led policing.

The background of the ISP

Today the unified structure of ISP is quite remarkable in that it performs patrol, investigations, technical services, information and technology, forensics, communications, integrity and agency support, responsibilities within a state that boasts a population that hovers somewhere around 12.8 million (Mayer, 2009, p.14). The ISP operates 21 District Headquarters, a far cry from the original 6 districts in 1922 (Falcone, 1998). Map 3.1 illustrates the 2012 map of the Illinois State Police (ISP) districts and their location.
Map 3.1

Illinois State Police District Map

Select a district or the county from one of the lists below. Or click a location on the map to view the ISP district in that area.

Map 3.1 illustrates the 2012 map of the Illinois State Police (ISP) districts and their locations (http://www.isp.state.il.us/aboutisp/history.cfm).

The organizational strength of the ISP in 1922 was authorized at no more than 100 officers (Illinois State Police, 1972). While ISP has participated in strategic planning activities for some time, the addition of public accountability through performance measurement has
breathed new life into the planning process. In the 2000 annual report, which covers calendar year (CY) 2000 and fiscal year (FY) 2001, the strategic issues were:

- Promote safety of the motoring public
- Combat the illegal use of guns and drugs
- Maintain forensic testing capabilities statewide
- Enhance departmental and state agency integrity
- Assess the availability of high-tech equipment and develop a plan to access this technology and share it with local law enforcement agencies
- Reduce the fear of crime
- Maintain systems to collect and share criminal justice data to aid in fighting crime (Illinois State Police Annual Report, 2000, p.11)

Today’s total departmental strength reaches 2,105 sworn officers, a reflection on the state’s burgeoning population density and the division of labor and specialization in police agencies that has developed as a response to demographic shifts Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS, 2008).

In Illinois, the ISP has imposed sweeping organizational and strategic changes in responding to homeland security demands. The ISP is a department in the executive branch of state government, consisting of four operational divisions; Administration, Forensic Services, Division of Internal Investigations and the Division of Operations. The following is a brief description of each of those divisions:
• Administration: the Division of Administration is responsible for administrative support required by all department entities. This division centralizes the department’s data processing, fiscal, logistical, and personnel.

• Forensic Services: the efforts of both state and municipal police officers are supplemented by the Division of Forensic Services, providing crime scene services, polygraph services, background checks requisite to the purchase of firearms and strategically located crime laboratories.

• Division of Internal Investigations: Internal Investigations specializes in investigating alleged misconduct, corruption conflict of interest and malfeasance within any agency under the jurisdiction of the governor.

• The Division of Operations’ services: Operations entail aircraft support for enforcement and public assistance; vehicle investigations; K-9 support for tracking and drug detection; presentations to the public on traffic safety and crime prevention; criminal investigations to detect and suppress the traffic of illicit drugs; develop strategic and tactical criminal intelligence data; investigate serious offenses; apprehend fugitives and the communications network. Operations, also provides support to many county, municipal and federal law enforcement agencies. (http://www.isp.state.il.us/aboutisp/history.cfm).
Figure 3.1 shows the 2012 command structure of the Illinois State Police (ISP). ([http://www.isp.state.il.us/aboutisp/history.cfm](http://www.isp.state.il.us/aboutisp/history.cfm)).

(ISP Command Structure, Recreated from [http://www.isp.state.il.us/aboutisp/history.cfm](http://www.isp.state.il.us/aboutisp/history.cfm))

In the aftermath of September 11, the operational responsibilities of the ISP exponentially increased. In addition to assisting the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) with the investigation into the terror attacks requiring a significant commitment of investigative capital
with large contingents of personnel. As homeland security operational responsibilities increased, the ISP continued to respond to calls for service, gather intelligence on criminal threats, conduct traditional, organized, and high-tech criminal investigations, provide specialized investigative support and forensic assets, supply support for the state’s law enforcement information and technology network, enforce commercial motor vehicle laws, provide investigative support and security for sporting and special events, investigate crimes occurring within casinos, and protect the state house governmental buildings and dignitaries (Illinois State Police 85th Anniversary Yearbook, 2007).

Faced with challenges brought on by the notion of providing homeland security, the ISP opted to reengineer its organizational framework to better plan and manage its resource allocations in respect to its operational responsibilities. First, a Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center (STIC) was constructed and configured around the organization’s duty to mobilize for threats to homeland security including large-scale emergencies and disasters. The ISP reconfigured those assets, which were associated with the response and mitigation side of homeland security. Many of these entities were positioned arbitrarily throughout the organization and instead required an arrangement that focused reporting under a single command responsible for homeland security.

With STIC formed, the ISP could now focus on transforming its investigations from one mired in traditional policing practices to one capable of confronting the investigative challenges brought on by homeland security. This responsibility lay squarely on the shoulders of the Deputy Director of Operations who had command over investigations. In May 2003, it became his duty to institute an agenda for change in order to divorce investigations from the institutional-
stasis in which it found itself. In order to signify a shift from a terrorism only intelligence emphasis to an “all crimes” intelligence focus, the State Wide Terrorism Intelligence Center (STIC) became known as the Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center in September 2004. With categorical emphasis and subject matter experts in terrorism, drug offenses, and general crimes, the revamped STIC offers research and analysis services to all law enforcement agencies in Illinois. In November 2005, STIC moved its operation to the newly constructed Statewide Emergency Operations Center (SEOC), home of the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA). This partnership allows for better communication and accessibility between two of the most important entities – emergency responders and the law enforcement intelligence community. The facility has state of the art technology, giving the analysts the tools that are needed to complete complex analysis and conduct research into their assigned terrorism groups, methods, and infrastructure targets (Illinois State Police Annual Report, 2006).

STIC has promoted a strong working relationship between the private and public security sectors. In August 2006 STIC partnered with the Department of Homeland Security to create an internet portal, improving the delivery of information to our private security partners. STIC has enhanced its analytical abilities through partnerships with the FBI and Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), who have committed resources currently assigned to STIC. The Department of Homeland Security also provided an analyst to STIC. STIC expanded it capabilities with the creation of an Internet Crimes Unit. Six analysts are assigned to this program and will take requests from law enforcement officials and the general public as well. Although STIC currently focuses on terrorism, narcotics, and violent crimes, two other functions – the Motor Vehicle Theft Clearinghouse and the Amber Alert Program also fall under the purview of STIC. These
units are dedicated to their specific tasks, but the information collected is an important part of the overall fusion center concept. This concept has served as a model for other state agencies nationwide which has completely changed the law enforcement landscape for years to come.

The Deputy Director recognized that intelligence-led policing was the most advantageous style of policing for the new investigations section STIC to adopt. Illinois’ homeland security response strategy is largely based on the availability of statewide deployable teams. These include a nationally honored (Harvard University Innovations) state agency team capable of working in a “hot zone” to deal with all aspects of a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) incident. In the Illinois State Police, The Office of Counter Terrorism operates under the Division of Operations Deputy Director’s Office to oversee all homeland security funding and programs for the ISP. Led by the Senior Terrorism Advisor, the office includes the complement of Illinois State Police officers detailed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s two Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) in Illinois. The highly-sensitive JTTF investigative activity is monitored through the Office of Counter Terrorism. Domestic and international terrorism activity which may affect Illinois is closely tracked and evaluated by the Senior Terrorism Advisor and staff, in collaboration with Statewide Terrorism Intelligence Center (STIC), and JTTFs, and various other federal, state, local, and military agencies (Illinois State Police Annual Report, 2006).

The Office of Counter Terrorism moved into the new $17 million State Emergency Operation Center in months of October/November 2005 (Illinois State Police Annual Report, 2006). Co-located with STIC in this state of the art facility, the Office of Counter Terrorism serves as the primary point of contact for the United States Department of Homeland Security
with state and local law enforcement agencies in Illinois (Illinois State Police 85th Anniversary Yearbook, 2007).

According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Office of Inspector General (DHSOIG) Audit Report October (2008). Some aspects of Illinois’ program management warrant recognition as “best practices.” The State of Illinois used a statewide Task Force and mutual aid organizations to plan, execute, and oversee homeland security programs and activities. The use of these organizations greatly enhanced the State’s success in setting and meeting goals and objectives under the State Homeland Security Grant Program. Based on DHSOIGs experience of auditing State Homeland Security Grant programs nationwide, this practice could be considered and applied to help improve grants management in other states and jurisdictions.

The Illinois Terrorism Task Force was the driving force for all planning, budgeting, funding, program execution, and evaluation of sub-grantee activities, including those of the statewide mutual aid organizations. The widely diverse composition of the Task Force membership and its involvement (via daily interaction and monthly meetings) in virtually all grant program and project activities enabled the State to manage the programs with constant input and assistance from sources across the State. As a result, the State has made significant progress in achieving statewide goals and objectives under the State Homeland Security Grant Program.

Because of the Illinois Task Force approach, the State did not experience many of the program weaknesses DHSOIG identified during audits of homeland security grant programs in
other states DHSOIG Audit Report (2008). Typical problems not found in the State of Illinois include:

- An absence of measurable program goals, objectives, priorities;
- Inadequate progress reporting and performance monitoring;
- Incomplete and inaccurate funds accounting;
- Inadequate equipment inventories and safeguards;
- Improper procurement practices; and
- Equipment purchased that was not needed or was not properly maintained (DHSOIG, 2008).

According to DHSOIGs, the Task Force approach warrants recognition as a best practice that could benefit other states or jurisdictions.

The homeland security duties of the Illinois Terrorism Task Force include:

- Developing the State’s domestic terrorism preparedness strategy,
- Advising the Illinois Emergency Management Agency on application and use of federal funding that relates to combating terrorism, and
- Annually reporting to the Governor on the activities, accomplishments, and recommendations of the Task Force (DHSOIG, 2008).

The next chapter will discuss research design and methodology of the Illinois State Police (ISP) case study interviews and the 50 state survey of state policing agencies and the impact on state policing since September 11, 2001 (9/11).
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Chapter IV

Research Design and Methodology

Despite more than 10 years since the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the Homeland Security Era, as it relates to policing, is still rapidly evolving. As White (2004) points out, law enforcement commanders remain befuddled over the evolving issue of homeland security. It seems as though, from the perspective of a police executive, their capacity to provide solutions to questions that arise from the newness of the homeland security field is clearly outpaced by the rate at which the questions arise. This presents a unique challenge for researchers. For one, there are a multitude of critical issues that warrant attention, in particular, civil liberties, intelligence gathering, privacy rights, police organization and its structure (White, 2004). Yet, because no suitable sampling framework exists, researchers must often rely on the comparative analysis of traditional policing problems when considering this type of homeland security issue. Recognizing this constraint, this research will compare and contrast conventional policing strategies using two methodologies: (1) a case study approach based on face-to-face qualitative interviews and (2) a multi-state survey approach.

Utilizing these methods, the research will provide a more comprehensive picture of what's happened in state policing since 9/11. By using both qualitative interviews and quantitative survey data, the research hopes to provide insight into the frequency of restructuring as a result of 9/11, the types of restructuring, and the external influences on restructuring.
Purpose of the Study

The events of September 11, 2001 (9/11) serve as a significant milestone in the history of state law enforcement. Consequently, this study will explore, first how the terrorist attacks have thrust policing into the new Homeland Security Era. Second, it will address how the events themselves have engendered the question for state law enforcement organizations to consider, including which style of policing best suits these organizations for carrying out their new homeland security mission. Lastly the research will explore how politics did or didn’t play a role in the restructuring of the ISP in the new Homeland Security Era as it implemented the intelligence – led policing strategy into their organization. This author had the opportunity to work for the ISP, post 9/11.

The catastrophic events of Sept. 11, 2001, served as a wake-up call to the nation regarding the threat of terrorism. Preventing future acts of terrorism and preparing for massive response operations became a national priority overnight for law enforcement at all levels, creating new responsibilities and new paradigms for federal, state and local law enforcement agencies.

Changes quickly took place in the federal government, including the creation of the new Department of Homeland Security and shifting priorities within the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other federal law enforcement agencies. At the state level, anecdotal evidence gathered soon after Sept. 11 indicated state police were engaging in many new homeland security roles, such as:

- coordinating homeland security at the state level;
- collecting, analyzing and sharing critical information and intelligence;
• protecting critical infrastructure and key assets;

• securing the nation’s borders, air and sea ports;

• collaborating with federal and local law enforcement on task forces; and

• preparing for new response equipment, tactics, systems and training.

Recognizing the difficulties associated with such institutional changes, this research seeks to answer the following questions:

• Research Question 1: What impact has September 11, 2001 had on the role and responsibilities of state policing?

• Research Question 2: How have states responded to this changing role? (strategies)

• Research Question 3: What role has politics played in restructuring state policing in the new homeland security era? (Institutional restructuring)

**Hypothesis**

The tragic events of September 11, 2001 (9/11) serve as a significant milestone in the history of state law enforcement. Consequently, this study will explore, first, how the terrorist attacks have thrust policing into the new Homeland Security Era. Second, it will address how the events themselves have engendered the question for state law enforcement organizations to consider, including which style of policing best suits these organizations for carrying out their new homeland security mission. Lastly, the research will explore how politics did or didn’t play a role in the restructuring of the ISP in the new Homeland Security Era as it implemented the intelligence-led policing option into their organization. The terrorists who spent times living
amongst us were in areas under the purview of state police organizations. With proper alignment and strategic focus, these organizations may perhaps disrupt or prevent future attacks.

**Research Design**

**Multi-State Survey**

This study developed and implemented both a multi – state survey approach and a case study approach based on face-to-face qualitative interview questions. The purpose of the survey was to determine what skills are needed by state policing agencies for success in the new policing era known as the Homeland Security Era. The case study is a face-to-face interview on the state police agency Illinois State Police (ISP) and the impact on state policing since September 11, 2001. This phase of the study examined the data collected for trends and differences between the independent variables of subject/content areas.

The data collected in this research study: a multi-state survey and a face-to-face qualitative interview. The survey was designed by the researcher to help identify strategies and other skills deemed important for state policing agencies to possess in order to be successful in their homeland security endeavors. The survey research design was applied to investigate the research questions. The survey was sent to 50 Public Information Officers (PIO’s) and their respective state police agencies. The survey pre-notification e-mail was sent March 23, 2012 to all potential respondents. The first invitation e-mail was sent out the following day, asking the PIO’s to take the survey. One follow-up e-mail was subsequently sent to the non-respondents to encourage them to take the survey. The last e-mail was sent on April 17, 2012 with a
notification that the survey will come to an end on April 23, 2012. Thus, the survey was in the field for four weeks. See Appendix for invitation e-mail.

Participants of the study were contacted by email explaining the research objective and asking them to participate. The survey requests were addressed to the Public Information Officers (PIO) of these agencies. The PIO’s were chosen because of the wide range of personnel who are in this position; it includes civilian as well as sworn personnel. The PIO’s handle media for their organizations. The objective of the research was to gather information about state policing, in particular, what changes in responsibilities/organization occurred in response to September 11, 2001 (9/11). The email also contained a link to the web-based survey (this is found in the Appendix of this research). Follow-up email contacts were sent to increase response rate. Upon completion of the survey, each respondent was directed to a web page thanking them for their response and offering them a copy of the study results if they were interested. Screen shots of the web-based survey are presented in the Appendix.

The web-based survey was conducted using surveymonkey.com, a survey software program offered online. The program provided a list management tool where responses be tracked by their email address which proved to be very useful for follow-up emails. The program also provided security including the option to turn on SSL (Secure Sockets Layers) to utilize data encryption and provide data protection.

Responses to the survey were recorded, exported in a spreadsheet, and transferred to a statistical software package for in-depth analysis. Descriptive statistics were calculated and data relationships were analyzed.
**Variables and Measures**

Variables used in the survey have been summarized in Table 4.1. The variables consisted of one independent variable that grouped respondents by common characteristics and five dependent variables that grouped responses by content categories. The independent variable included the impact of September 11, 2001 (9/11) on state policing. The dependent variables included change in staffing, change in organization, change in budgets, change in strategies, and change in training.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables (n=1)</th>
<th>Dependent Variables (n=5)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Impact of September 11, 2001 (9/11) on state policing.</td>
<td>Change in staffing</td>
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<td>Change in organization</td>
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<td>Change in strategies</td>
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<td>Change in training</td>
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**Survey Analysis**

To begin the survey analysis process, the independent variables to summarize and describe the data were collected. Survey results were measured by category. There were five categories (subscales), representing the five dependent variables. Responses to the survey items were coded from 1 to 5 depending on the importance of each. One represented Yes or No, two
represented Single Division or Entire State Police Agency, three represented Increased personnel, Doing more with less personnel, Specialized Terrorism Units, More Funding, Less Funding, More Training and Less Training, four represented Community Policing, Problem Oriented Policing, and other, five represented, As a Traditional Crime or Strictly as a Terrorist Crime. The code for all survey items in the same category were summed together for a composite score per category. This category composite score was used for statistical analysis.
Item analysis was conducted to determine the internal consistency and reliability of each individual items as well as each subscale.

Selection response-tests (multiple-choice) were used to reach conclusions and make generalizations about the characteristics of populations based on data collected from the survey. Percentages were used to identify state policing skills that members deem important for all state police agencies to possess. An index (composite measure) of variables was used to look for significant differences between the state policing agencies members deem important when grouped by work area, age group, organizational status, pay grade or years of state experience.

The timeline for survey/interviews was completed on the 23rd of April 2012. Follow up emails were sent out one week from the initial email and then two weeks later announcing the end of the survey/interviews. The data analysis took place in the month of April 2012.

Field Interviews

An informal pilot study was conducted with a small group of state police members at the researcher’s case study, ISP. Conducting a pilot study allowed the researcher to ask participants for suggestive feedback on the survey/interviews and also helped eliminate author bias. Once
the pilot survey and interviews had been modified as per the feedback, the survey was administered online and the interviews were face-to-face.

The purpose for the interviews: Individuals were recruited based on a convenience sample of police officers who have or currently work for the (ISP) and who are former colleagues of the student researcher. Participants were selected for their knowledge and experience in the (ISP) pre and post 9/11. Interviews were more in-depth and participants were asked to take part in a face to face interview that lasted for 45 minutes.

This study will explore, first, how the terrorist attacks have thrust policing into the new Homeland Security Era. Second, it will address how the events themselves have engendered the question for state law enforcement organizations to consider, including which style of policing best suits these organizations for carrying out their new homeland security mission. Lastly, the research interviews will explore how politics did or did not play a role in the restructuring of the ISP in the new Homeland Security Era.

A face-to-face interview is a telephone survey without the telephone. The interviewer physically travels to the respondent’s location to conduct a personal interview. Unlike the free-wheeling type of interview one sees on 60 Minutes, where the interviewer adapts the questions on the fly based on previous responses (or lack thereof), face-to-face interviews follow a standardized script without deviation, just like a mail or telephone survey. From the respondent’s point of view, the process could not be easier: the interviewer arrives at a convenient, pre-arranged time, reads the interview questions for you, deals with any questions or problems that arise, records your answers, and is shown the door. No one calls you during supper and there are no envelopes to lick. This ease of response in fact makes face-to-face interviews ideally suited
for populations that have difficulty answering mail or telephone surveys due to poor reading or writing skills, disability, or infirmity. Compared with mail and telephone surveys, face-to-face interviews offer significant advantages in terms of the amount and complexity of the data that can be collected.

For example, face-to-face interviews can be significantly longer. Most people will allow an interviewer to occupy their living room couch for up to an hour, whereas respondents will typically not tolerate telephone interviews that extend much beyond half an hour or mail surveys that require more than 15 or 20 minutes of effort. The additional length allows researchers the opportunity to ask more questions, longer questions, more detailed questions, more open-ended questions, and more complicated or technical questions. Skip patterns, in which different respondents navigate different paths through the interview depending on their answers, can also be more complicated. In addition, the use of graphic or visual aids, impossible by telephone and costly by mail, can be easily and economically incorporated into face-to-face interviews.

Face-to-face interviews also offer advantages in terms of data quality. More than any other survey delivery mode, a face-to-face interview allows researchers a high degree of control over the data collection process and environment. Interviewers can ensure, for example, that respondents do not skip ahead or “phone a friend,” as they might do when filling out a mail survey, or that they do not watch TV or surf the internet during the interview, as they might do during a telephone survey. Since the interviewer elicits and records the data, the problems of missing data, ambiguous markings, and illegible handwriting that plague mail surveys are eliminated. If the respondent finds a question to be confusing or ambiguous, the interviewer can immediately clarify it. Similarly, the respondent can be asked to clarify any answers that the interviewer cannot interpret.
Perhaps the most important procedural variable affecting data quality in a survey study is the response rate, that is, the number of completed questionnaires obtained divided by the number of people who were asked to complete them. Since it is much more difficult for people to shut the door in the face of a live human being than hang up on a disembodied voice or toss a written survey into the recycling bin with the junk mail, face-to-face interviews typically offer the highest response rates obtainable (over 90% in some cases). Like telephone surveys, face-to-face interviews also avoid a type of response bias typical of mail surveys, namely, the tendency for respondents, on average, to be more highly educated than those who fail to respond.

Of course, all of these benefits typically come at a great cost to the researchers, who must carefully hire, train, and monitor the interviewers and pay them to travel from one neighborhood to the next (and sometimes back again) knocking on doors. Largely due to the nature and cost of the travel involved, face-to-face interviews can end up costing more than twice as much and taking more than three times as long to complete as an equivalent telephone survey. Face-to-face interviews can also have additional disadvantages. For example, budgetary constraints typically limit them to a comparatively small geographical area. Also, some populations can be difficult to reach in person because they are rarely at home (e.g., college students), access to their home or apartment is restricted, or traveling in their neighborhood places interviewers at risk. There is also evidence that questions of a personal nature are less likely to be answered fully and honestly in a face-to-face interview. This is probably because respondents lose the feeling of anonymity that is easily maintained when the researcher is safely ensconced in an office building miles away. In addition, since face-to-face interviews put people on the spot by requiring an immediate answer, questions that require a lot of reflection or a search for personal records are better handled by the self-paced format of a mail survey.
Perhaps the largest “cost” associated with a face-to-face interview is the increased burden placed on the researcher to ensure that the interviewers who are collecting the data do not introduce “interviewer bias,” that is, do not, through their words or actions, unintentionally influence respondents to answer in a particular way. While interviewer bias is also a concern in telephone surveys, it poses even more of a problem in face-to-interviews surveys for two reasons. First, the interviewer is exposed to the potentially biasing effect of the respondent’s appearance and environment in addition to their voice. Second, the interviewer may inadvertently give respondents nonverbal as well as verbal cues about how they should respond. Interviewing skills do not come naturally to people since a standardized interview violates some of the normative rules of efficient conversation. For instance, interviewers must read all questions and response options exactly as written rather than paraphrasing them, since even small changes in wording have the potential to influence interview outcomes. Interviewers also have to ask a question even when the respondent has already volunteered the answer. To reduce bias as well as to avoid interviewer effects, that is, the tendency for the data collected by different interviewers to differ due to procedural inconsistency, large investments must typically be made in providing interviewers the necessary training and practice. Data analyses of face-to-face interviews should also examine and report on any significant interviewer effects identified in the data.

In summary, face-to-face interviews offer many advantages over mail and telephone surveys in terms of the complexity and quality of the data collected, but these advantages come with significantly increased logistical costs as well as additional potential sources of response bias. The costs are in fact so prohibitive that face-to-face interviews are typically employed only when telephone surveys are impractical (for example, when the questionnaire is too long or
complex to deliver over the phone or when a significant proportion of the population of interest lacks telephone access).

Responses to the interviews were recorded, exported in a spreadsheet, and transferred to a statistical software package for in-depth analysis. The interview data relationships were analyzed. The face-to-face interview questions are listed in the Appendix of this research.

Variables used in the interview have been summarized in Table 4.2. The variables consisted of one independent variable that grouped respondents by common characteristics and six dependent variables that grouped responses by content categories. The independent variable included the impact of September 11, 2001 (9/11) on state policing. The dependent variables included duties prior to 9/11, change organization since 9/11, change in budgets or funding, current strategies, Factors that lead to changes and who facilitated them and, Causes of changes.

Table 4.2
Summary of Dependent and Independent Variables in the State Policing Interview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables (n=1)</th>
<th>Dependent Variables (n=6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Impact of September 11, 2001 (9/11) on state policing.</td>
<td>Duties prior to 9/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Change in organization since 9/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Change in budgets or funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Current strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Factors that lead to changes and who facilitated them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Causes for changes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Interview Analysis

To begin the interview analysis process, the independent variables to summarize and describe the interview data were collected. Interview results were measured by category. There were five categories (subscales), representing the six dependent variables. Responses to the interview items were coded from 1 to 6 depending on the importance of each. One represented Key responsibilities of state police prior to 9/11, two represented Change in your state police agency since 9/11, three represented Change in budget priorities or allocation of funds, four represented Current policing strategies in your state police agency five represented, Factors that lead to change or who facilitated these changes, six represented, Thoughts on the causes of changes in your state police agency since 9/11. The codes for all interview items in the same category were summed together for a composite score per category. This category composite score was used for statistical analysis. Item analysis was conducted to determine the internal consistency and reliability of each individual items as well as each subscale.

Selection response-tests (multiple-choice) were used to reach conclusions and make generalizations about the characteristics of populations based on data collected from the interview. Percentages were used to identify state policing skills that members deem important for all state police agencies to possess. An index (composite measure) of variables was used to look for significant differences between the state policing agencies members deem important when grouped by work area, age group, organizational status, pay grade or years of state experience.
Ethical Issues

Confidentiality

In order to ensure confidentiality, records will be kept private as required by law. Chelsea Haring, Ph.D., the Project Director, Joseph A. Iniguez, the Student Researcher who is conducting the survey/interviews will be the only individuals who will have access to the raw data. Data files will be kept on a computer and password protected. Only the study researcher will have the password. Any identifying information will be removed from the date files and replaced with an ID number. Names, or any other identifying information, will not be used in reporting the data. Findings will be reported in aggregates and not based on individual responses.

Voluntary Participation

The researcher needed to make sure that participation is completely voluntary. Within the Informed Consent Forms, it lists a section on Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal: It states that participation in this research is voluntary; You do not have to be in this study. You can stop participating at any time. If there are any questions you do not want to answer, you can skip them. The Informed Consent Forms for the survey and interviews are listed in the Appendix of this research.

Risks/ Benefits

The Risks/Benefits are listed in the Informed Consent Forms for the survey and interviews. Under Risk, it states that there may be a risk of felling some discomfort with some of the questions. If so, you can talk to the interviewer at any time, stop the interview. Under Benefits, it states that doing this study may not benefit you personally. Overall, we hope to gain
information about how state policing has been restructured to better serve your state. The
Informed Consent Forms, and the Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval are located in the
Appendix of this research.

The following chapter lists the discussion and analysis, lessons learned and the conclusion of this research.
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Chapter V
Discussion and Analysis

The tragic events of September 11, 2001 (9/11) serve as a significant milestone in the history of state law enforcement. Consequently, this study explored, first, how the terrorist attacks have thrust policing into the new Homeland Security Era. Secondly, it addressed how the events themselves have engendered the question for state law enforcement organizations to consider, including which style of policing best suits these organizations for carrying out their homeland security mission. Lastly, the research explored how politics did, or did not play a role in the restructuring of the ISP in the Homeland Security Era.

A total of 8 PIO’s (8/50) responded to the survey (6.25 percent) and 1 PIO (0.02) opted out of taking the survey. A possible cause for the lack of responses of potential participants are particularly salient for web users, including Internet security and the receipt of electronic “junk mail” or “spam”. Variables used in the survey have been summarized in Table 5.1. The variables consisted of one independent variable that grouped respondents by common characteristics and five dependent variables that grouped responses by content categories. The independent variable included the impact of September 11, 2001 (9/11) on state policing. The dependent variables included change in staffing, change in organization, change in budgets, change in strategies, and change in training.
Table 5.1
Summary of the state policing survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Question</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Change in Staffing? Please select all that apply.</td>
<td>Doing more with less personnel</td>
<td>Doing more with less personnel 100%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Specialized Terrorism Units</td>
<td>Specialized Terrorism Units 37.5%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less funding</td>
<td>Less funding 37.5%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Change in organization?</td>
<td>Single Division</td>
<td>Single Division 50%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Entire State Police Agency</td>
<td>Entire State Police Agency 50%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Change in Budgets?</td>
<td>Less funding</td>
<td>Less funding 37.5%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Change in Strategies?</td>
<td>Community Policing</td>
<td>Community Policing 16.7%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligence-Led Policing</td>
<td>Intelligence-Led Policing 100%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Other 16.7%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Change in Training?</td>
<td>More Training</td>
<td>More Training 50%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less Training</td>
<td>Less Training 25%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1, shows the replies to the survey while it was open, from March 23, 2012 until April 23, 2012. A total of 8 PIO’s (8/50) responded to the survey (6.25 percent) and 1 PIO (0.02) opted out of taking the survey. In summary, Table 5.1 shows that change in staffing was due to the creation of specialized units, change in organization did happen, the change in budgets
were less funding, change in strategies were to Intelligence-led Policing, and changes in training was more training due to specialized units.

Selection response-tests (multiple-choice) were used to reach conclusions and make generalizations about the characteristics of populations based on data collected from the survey. Percentages were used to identify state policing skills that members deem important for all state police agencies to possess. An index (composite measure) of variables was used to look for significant differences between the state policing agencies members deem important when grouped by: work area, age group, organizational status, pay grade or years of state experience. The type of tests utilized to answer specific research questions are summarized in Table 5.2 which shows survey responses (8/50) to the demographic questions in the 50 state survey.

Table 5.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research question#</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Where do you work?</td>
<td>Headquarters or Field</td>
<td>Headquarters 62.5% Field 37.5%</td>
<td>5 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What is your organizational status?</td>
<td>Non-supervisor, team leader, supervisor, manager, or executive</td>
<td>Non-supervisor 12.5% Supervisor 37.5% Manager 37.5% Executive 12.5%</td>
<td>1 3 3 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. What is your age group?</td>
<td>25 and under, 26-29, 30-39,40-49,50-59</td>
<td>30-39 12.5% 40-49 50.0% 50-59 37.5%</td>
<td>1 4 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. What is your pay category/grade?</td>
<td>Director, Superintendent, First Deputy, Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel, Major, Captain, Lieutenant, or other</td>
<td>Colonel 14.3% Captain 71.4% Lieutenant 14.3% Other 14.3%</td>
<td>1 5 1 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The interview portion of this study consisted of police officers/troopers at the state level who have retired or are currently working for the Illinois State Police (ISP), the agency being studied. The student researcher had the opportunity to work with, or directly, for the interviewed respondents. Any identifying information was removed from the data files and replaced with an ID Number. Names, or any other identifying information were not used in reporting the data. This researcher interviewed a total of three (3) respondents. The interviews are listed as Number One occurring on March 24, 2012; Number Two: March 29, 2012; and the final interview, Number Three: April 9, 2012.

The variables consisted of one independent variable that grouped respondents by common characteristics and six dependent variables that grouped responses by content categories. The independent variable included the impact of September 11, 2001 (9/11) on state policing. The dependent variables included duties prior to 9/11, organizational changes since 9/11, changes in budgets and/or funding, current strategies, factors that lead to changes (and who facilitated them) and, causes of changes. The following paragraphs illustrate the results of the face-to-face interviews on the case study at the Illinois State Police (ISP).

All the Respondents were asked about State Police duties prior to 9/11. and they unanimously answered the following: patrol, investigations, crime scene, evidence processing, critical incidents, and assisting federal, county and local law enforcement agencies. The
respondents were asked about changes in the organization since 9/11. Again, all three Respondents provided identical changes. They said that more preparation, training for critical incidents, primarily terrorism driven events was offered; the creation and increased training of multiple State weapons of mass destruction teams; and other special units. When asked about budgets and funding, Respondents one and two replied that federal resources became more plentiful for the special units. Respondent number three stated, “funds will be very hard to come by in the near future as the federal government tends to allocate less funding for states.”

The question of policing strategies was next in line. All three respondents responded that, by ISP placing a large emphasis on Intelligence-led Policing, results have appeared successful and are continually showing positive results. When asked about the factors that lead to the changes and who facilitated them, all Respondents said that the quest for greater efficiency in public safety and that many individuals contributed to this change. When asked for the causes for the changes, all Respondents believed that the changes created a positive evolution in law enforcement; enhanced by education, greater preparation for critical incidents and, ultimately, a better focused policing strategy that contributes to increased and greater public safety.

While conducting the interviews, this author had the opportunity to ask all respondents about the role of politics and its role in restructuring of their state police agency. Respondent number one didn’t see any role of politics in the restructuring. Respondents two and three saw the director of the agency as being political, as he is appointed by the Governor of Illinois. Respondent three, stated that “I thought that Illinois Governor Rod Blagojveich was slightly retarded just by the way he acted around his police detail that protected him.”
Selection response-tests (multiple-choice) were used to reach conclusions and make generalizations about the characteristics of populations based on data collected from the interview. Percentages were used to identify state policing skills that members deem important for all state police agencies to possess. An index (composite measure) of variables was used to look for significant differences between the state policing agencies members identified as important when grouped by work area, age group, organizational status, pay grade/years of state experience. The type of tests that were used to answer specific research questions are summarized in Table 5.3.

Table 5.3 illustrates the responses to the demographic questions in the face-to-face interviews (3/3) on the case study of the Illinois State Police (ISP).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research question#</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Where do you work?</td>
<td>Headquarters or Field</td>
<td>Headquarters 33 % Field 67 %</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What is your organizational status?</td>
<td>Non-supervisor, team leader, supervisor, manager, or executive</td>
<td>Supervisor 67 % Executive 33 %</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. What is your age group?</td>
<td>25 and under, 26-29, 30-39,40-49,50-59</td>
<td>50-59 100%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. What is your pay category/grade?</td>
<td>Director, Superintendent, First Deputy, Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel, Major, Captain, Lieutenant, or other</td>
<td>Captain 67 % Colonel 33 %</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. How long have you been with the State Government?</td>
<td>Less than 1 year, 1 to 3 years, 4 to 5 years, 6 to 10 years, 11 to 14 years, 15 to 20 years, more than</td>
<td>More than 20 years 100%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Lessons Learned

America’s reaction to the tragic events of September 11th, 2001 demonstrated the nation’s unity and resolve. The partnerships forged that late summer day, and each day since, are the foundation for the country’s unprecedented response. State and local governments from across the nation lent their professional first-responders and other precious resources to aid communities impacted by the New York, Pentagon and Pennsylvania attacks. The lesson learned was that neither Federal, nor state, nor local governments alone could match the power of partnerships.

There is no doubt state police are much better prepared, and take emergencies much more seriously now than 10 years ago. As a prime example: the east coast, endured an earthquake and a hurricane in the same week. Through trial, error and lessons learned from unimaginable catastrophes 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, the nation was much better equipped to handle many more possibilities that were thrown at the east coast that week. Preparation time and resources were increased, and allowing for faster and more appropriate response teams to provide the necessary talent and relief that was needed at state and local level.

The creation and acceptance of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has played a critical role in leading and coordinating, preparation and response to terror threats, allowing local governments to tailor the challenge of homeland security and emergency preparedness at the community level.
State and local governments, along with private industries, accept that they have a role to play in homeland security. The FBI and local law enforcement have had some successes in prevention, as well. There are a number of foiled terrorist attack attempts that one is not going to hear about. Defending the country from terror groups without borders continues to be an ongoing challenge for the U. S.

It has taken some time to seep into the psyche of politicians that it is not just nation-states that are of great concern. For decades, it was very easy for politicians to point at a map and say, this is the area/country from which the threat comes! The events that occurred on September 11, 2001, changed the world forever and forced politicians to this new realization.

Ten years after the terror attacks, some scholars do not consider threats from non-state actors to be an issue. But they are a strategic threat. They may not be able to take down the United States, but a strong ideology that is committed to causing harm can plunge nations into civil war. The U.S. strategy in dealing with terrorism has changed since the attacks, it is a global radical ideology that must now be addressed. Another lesson learned is that terrorism, which appeared to solely target other countries, can also happen here. Even though the United States is the richest country in the world, America’s open society makes it vulnerable to threats, and that is not going to change.

The memory of the 9/11 attacks has faded with time, especially for people living away from the east coast. However, people living in the New York metropolitan area and the Washington D.C. area, including Virginia and Maryland, live with a heightened sense of the dangers, more so than people in other parts of the country, though the 10 year anniversary boosted their awareness. Photos and videos of those towers being hit and of the Pentagon on fire, serve as painful reminders.
The killing of Osama bin Laden by U. S. forces in Pakistan in May 2011 will not singlehandedly end terrorism, though bin Laden’s death removed a charismatic leader from the al-Qaida terror group. Since bin Laden’s death, all levels of government need to look at this as a three-phase era. In the first era, there will be some ‘lone wolves’ committed to honoring bin Laden and working to carry out his plans. In the second era, they may start gathering in small groups of two or three working together. The third era will see a formation of al-Qaida franchises that are larger and better organized. Those three threat scenarios are more complex than dealing with the core al-Qaida organization.

Cyber terrorism is an emerging threat, particularly when coupled with more traditional attacks such as bombings or bioterrorism. There has yet to be a repeat attack. Attempts have been foiled or bungled, as the nation is better prepared and the attackers appear to be less competent.

Conclusion

The calamitous events of September 11, 2001, provoked a realization that police organizations nationwide must better organize themselves to defend the homeland against an asymmetric threat. The threat, represented by a foreign enemy with the ingenuity, desire and wherewithal to penetrate America’s conventional defenses, may still be living among us. This notion has transformed the police from crime fighters to defenders of the homeland. The challenge is great considering the advent of homeland security presses the need for operational readiness, intelligence and warning, and a strategic planning outlook embedded directly into the core of state police organizations.
For state police organizations, the metamorphosis requires far greater change than for the majority of their county and local counterparts. The nature of state police obligates them to bear the bulk of new duties and responsibilities coupled with this new era of homeland security. Of course, for these organizations forced to balance crime control with security, a homeland defense mandate will certainly induce change. It will compel them to shed traditional reactive styles of policing for more proactive methods considered necessary for tackling problems before they mature and potentially cause colossal destruction or impact on the state, all while continuing to respond to the plethora of issues intrinsic to traditional policing.

An amalgam of disparate elements makes up today’s model for homeland security. Guided by legal and social influences, these elements include intelligence and warning, border and transportation security, domestic counter-terrorism, protection of critical infrastructure, defending against catastrophic threats, and emergency preparedness and response. Taken together, they require changes in the way in which state police perform and how they choose to allocate their resources. Achieving these fundamental qualities, commands an agenda for change vital towards separating organizations from the institutional-stasis in which they find themselves.

Against the backdrop of these homeland security rudiments and by applying a policy options analysis framework, this research compared and contrasted three policing paradigms. The research assessed the professional, community-policing, and intelligence-led policing models for their practical application in the homeland security era. The intent of the investigation was to advocate for a suitable agenda for change, in respect to one of these paradigms, that a state police organization could espouse in order to tackle the challenges of promoting homeland security. In the final analysis, it was intelligence-led policing that proved
favorable towards advancing operational readiness, intelligence and warning and strategic intelligence planning, all to better protect our citizens.

The homeland security milieu is a volatile and amorphous realm, accounting for an environment that both criminals and terrorists endeavor to exploit. Taking charge of this environment requires police decision-makers to commit the essential assets aimed at interpreting its threats. Through the cycle of intelligence, decision-makers can effectively allocate resources compulsory for addressing the problems revealed within the environment. The intelligence-led policing model, a system that depends on the production and dissemination of finished analytical products aimed at influencing decision makers, will widen an organization’s capacity for engaging multiple responsibilities. Consequently, this research argues that intelligence-led policing is the principal policing paradigm necessary for planning and supporting the various enterprises that state police organizations will inevitably encounter while providing a blanket of homeland security.

The ISP was used extensively as a case study because, in carrying out this preference of intelligence-led policing as its primary agenda for change, it underwent a notable reorganization. The restructuring amounted to a transformation from a traditional policing entity to one that is now “intelligence driven.” The transformation included removing architectural barriers, adopting the processes intrinsic to an intelligence-led policing philosophy, creating a fusion center, retooling the distribution and management of its statewide system, and adopting a regional accountability plan for managing intelligence and enforcement operations related to organized criminal activities of a criminal or terrorist nature. By adopting the intelligence-led
policing model, the Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center (STIC) branch amplified its capabilities for confronting the investigate challenges of the homeland security era.

Previous research has demonstrated that intelligence-led policing is an effective crime reduction strategy. Yet, concerning homeland security, there are no quantitative or qualitative studies that assess the effectiveness of an intelligence-led policing program. With the adoption of intelligence-led policing by the ISP there exists a notable opportunity for future research in this remarkable field. A prospective research project may include assessing the process outputs and outcomes the intelligence-led policing ought to generate as it endeavors to influence organizational decision-making. In addition, by evaluating how intelligence-led policing disrupts potential criminal and terrorist activity through defusing opportunities and vulnerabilities that sustain illicit activity, police commanders can construct a framework useful for managing accountability in the intelligence-led policing domain.
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Appendix

Appendix A

Survey Informed Consent

Governors State University
Political Justice Studies
Informed Consent

Title: Restructuring of State Policing Post 9/11

Project Director: Chelsea Haring, Ph.D.
Student Researcher: Joseph A. Iniguez
Project Number: #12-03-03

Purpose:
You are invited to be part of a research study. The study is a 50 state survey of state policing agencies and the impact on state policing since September 11, 2001 (9/11). The study is being done by Joseph A. Iniguez, Student Researcher at Governors State University, University Park, Illinois.

Procedures:
The purpose of the study is to learn how state policing agencies restructured since September 11, 2001 (9/11). The study is using a web-based survey, surveymonkey.com, a survey software program offered online. It consists of ten (10) multiple choice questions five (5) on the state police agency and five (5) demographic questions. The survey takes about 10 to 15 minutes.

Risks:
There may be a risk of feeling some discomfort with some of the questions. If so, you can talk to the interviewer at any time, stop the survey.

Benefits:
Doing this study may not benefit you personally. Overall, we hope to gain information about how state policing has been restructured to better serve your state.

Confidentiality:
We will keep your records private as required by law. Chelsea Haring, the Project Director, Joseph A. Iniguez, the Student Researcher who is conducting the survey will see the information you give. Information may also be shared with those who make sure the study is done correctly (GSU Institutional Review Board). Data files can only be opened with a password. Only study researchers will have the password. Your name will be removed from all files after data collection is over. An ID number will then be used. The key to identify research participants will be stored in a locked cabinet. The key will be destroyed at the end of the project. Your name will not be used when we present this study or publish it.

Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal:

Participation in this research is voluntary. You do not have to be in this study. You can stop participating at any time. If there are any questions you do not want to answer, you can skip them.

Contact Persons:

If you have other questions about the survey, please call Chelsea Haring, Ph.D at 708-534-4575 or send her an email at charing@govst.edu and/or Joseph A. Iniguez, Student Researcher, send him an email at jiniguez@student.govst.edu .

If you have any questions regarding you or your child’s rights as a participant in this research study or concerns regarding the study itself, you may also contact the Co-Chairs of the Governors State University Institutional Review Board (IRB): David Rhea, Ph.D. at 708-534-4392 or Dale Schuit, Ph.D. at 708-235-2148 or email at irb@irbagovst.edu.

Please keep a copy of this consent form for your records. We will be happy to address any questions you may have about the research study we call you.

___________________________________________________
Chelsea Haring, Ph.D.  (Projector Director)

___________________________________________________
Joseph A. Iniguez, (Student Researcher)

Project Number: #12-03-03
Respondent
Appendix B
Interview Informed Consent Form
Governors State University
Political Justice Studies
Informed Consent

Title: Restructuring of State Policing Post 9/11

Project Director: Chelsea Haring, Ph.D.
Student Researcher: Joseph A. Iniguez
Project Number: #12-03-03

Purpose:
You are invited to be part of a research study. The study is an interview on state policing agencies and the impact on state policing since September 11, 2001 (9/11). The study is being done by Joseph A. Iniguez, Student Researcher at Governors State University, University Park, Illinois.

Procedures:
The purpose of the study is to learn how state policing agencies restructured since September 11, 2001 (9/11). The participants being interviewed are police officers/troopers at the state level who have retired or are currently working for the Illinois State Police (ISP), the agency being studied. The interview will consist of five (5) unstructured questions and five (5) demographic questions. All participants will be contacted via email or personal telephone calls. The interview takes about 30 to 45 minutes.

Risks:
There may be a risk of feeling some discomfort with some of the questions. If so, you can talk to the interviewer at any time, stop the interview.

Benefits:
Doing this study may not benefit you personally. Overall, we hope to gain information about how state policing has been restructured to better serve your state.

Confidentiality:
We will keep your records private as required by law. Chelsea Haring, the Project Director, Joseph A. Iniguez, the Student Researcher who is conducting the survey will see the information you give. Information may also be shared with those who make sure the study is done correctly.
(GSU Institutional Review Board). Data files can only be opened with a password. Only study researchers will have the password. Your name will be removed from all files after data collection is over. An ID number will then be used. The key to identify research participants will be stored in a locked cabinet. The key will be destroyed at the end of the project. Your name will not be used when we present this study or publish it.

Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal:

Participation in this research is voluntary. You do not have to be in this study. You can stop participating at any time. If there are any questions you do not want to answer, you can skip them.

Contact Persons:

If you have other questions about the interview, please call Chelsea Haring, Ph.D. at 708-534-4575 or send her an email at charing@govst.edu and/or Joseph A. Iniguez, Student Researcher, send him an email at jiniguez@student.govst.edu.

If you have any questions regarding you or your child’s rights as a participant in this research study or concerns regarding the study itself, you may also contact the Co-Chairs of the Governors State University Institutional Review Board (IRB): David Rhea, Ph.D. at 708-534-4392 or Dale Schuit, Ph.D. at 708-235-2148 or email at irb@irbagovst.edu.

Please keep a copy of this consent form for your records. We will be happy to address any questions you may have about the research study we call you.

___________________________________________________
Chelsea Haring, Ph.D. (Projector Director)

___________________________________________________
Joseph A. Iniguez, (Student Researcher)

___________________________________________________
Respondent
Appendix C
Recruitment Email

Email recruitment materials used with this study.

Good Morning/Afternoon,

You are invited to be part of a research study. The study is a 50 state survey of state policing agencies and the impact on state policing since September 11, 2001 (9/11). The survey is titled, Restructuring of State Policing Post 9/11. The survey will be web-based via SurveyMonkey.com. The study is being done by Joseph Iniguez, Student Researcher at Governors State University, College of Arts and Sciences, University Park, Illinois, 60466.

The purpose of the study is to learn how state policing agencies restructured as a result of September 11, 2001 (9/11). Participation in this research is voluntary. I have attached an Informed Consent Form. If you are interested in hearing back from me directly with the results of the study, please provide some contact information. Otherwise, you may check via my email address for results. If you have questions, or require additional information later, please feel free to contact me. Email will guarantee the quickest response: Joseph A. Iniguez, jiniguez@student.govst.edu.

Thank you,
Joseph Iniguez

Good Morning/Afternoon,

You are invited to be part of a research study. The study is an interview on state policing agencies and the impact on state policing since September 11, 2001 (9/11). It is titled, Restructuring of State Policing Post 9/11. The study is being done by Joseph Iniguez, Student Researcher at Governors State University, College of Arts and Sciences, University Park, Illinois, 60466.

The purpose of the study is to learn how state policing agencies restructured as a result of September 11, 2001 (9/11). The participants being interviewed are police officers/troopers at the state level who have retired or are currently working for the Illinois State Police (ISP), the agency being studied. Participation in this research is voluntary. I have attached an Informed Consent Form. If you are interested in hearing back from me directly with the results of the study, please provide some contact information. Otherwise, you may check via my email address for results. If you have questions, or require additional information, please feel free to contact me. Email will guarantee the quickest response: Joseph A. Iniguez, jiniguez@student.govst.edu.

Thank you,
Joseph Iniguez
Appendix D

Interview Questions and Demographics

Governors State University
College of Arts and Sciences
1 University Parkway
University Park, IL 60466

You are invited to be part of a research study. The study is an interview on state policing agencies and the impact on state policing since September 11, 2001 (9/11). The purpose of the study is to learn how state policing agencies changed since September 11, 2001 (9/11). The interview takes about 30 to 45 minutes. Doing this study may not benefit you personally. Overall, we hope to gain information about how state policing has been changed to better serve your state.

Your records will be private as required by law. Your name will be removed from all files after data collection is over. An ID number will then be used. Your name will not be used when we present this study or publish it. Participation in this research is voluntary. You do not have to be in this study. You can stop participating at any time. If there are any questions you do not want to answer, you can skip them.

Interview Questions

The following interview questions address the extent to which state policing agencies have moved to a post 9/11 policing model:

Interview Question 1: What were the key responsibilities of state police agencies prior to 9/11?

Interview Question 2: Has there been a change in your state police agency since September 11, 2001 (9/11)? If so, describe the changes.

Interview Question 3: Has there been a change in budget priorities or the allocation of funds within state policing? If so, please describe.
Interview Question 4: What are the current policing strategies that your state police agency is utilizing? (Such, as Community Policing, Intelligence-Led Policing).

Interview Question 5: What factors lead to this change? Or who facilitated these changes?

Interview Question 6: What are your thoughts on the causes of changes in your state police agency since September 11, 2001 (9/11)? Please elaborate.

### Demographic Characteristics

**Where do you work?**
- Headquarters
- Field

**What is your supervisory status?**
- Non-Supervisor
- Team Leader
- Supervisor
- Manager
- Executive
- Other

**What is your age group?**
- 25 and under
- 26-29
- 30-39
- 40-49
What is your pay category/grade?

- 50-59
- 60 or older
- Director
- Superintendent
- First Deputy
- Colonel
- Lieutenant Colonel
- Major
- Captain
- Lieutenant
- Other

How long have you been with the State Government?

- Less than 1 year
- 1 to 3 years
- 4 to 5 years
- 6 to 10 years
- 11 to 14 years
- 15 to 20 years
- More than 20 Years

Thank you for doing this interview.
Appendix E

50 State Survey

SurveyMonkey.com
This is a 50 state survey of state policing agencies and the impact of 9/11.

1. Did you notice a change in the responsibilities of your organization as a result of the events of September 11, 2001?

☐ Yes
☐ No

2. If the organization changed, did it involve a single division or the entire state police agency?

Please check appropriate box.

☐ Single Division
☐ Entire State Police Agency

3. In what ways did your organization change since September 11, 2001?

Please select all options that apply to you by checking all relevant boxes below.

☐ Increase personnel
☐ Doing more with less personnel
☐ Specialized Terrorism Units
☐ More Funding
☐ Less Funding
☐ More Training
☐ Less Training

4. What strategies have your state police agency adopted under the Homeland Security Era?

Please select all that apply.

☐ Community Policing
☐ Problem Oriented Policing
☐ Intelligence-led Policing
5. How does your state police agency treat terrorism?

Please select appropriate box.

Traditional Crime: “Conduct in violation of the criminal laws of a state, the federal government, or a local jurisdiction for which there is no legally acceptable justification or excuse. Such, as property crimes, rape, robberies, assaults and kidnapping”

Terrorist Crime: “The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives”

☐ How does your state police agency treat terrorism? Please select appropriate box. Traditional Crime: “Conduct in violation of the criminal laws of a state, the federal government, or a local jurisdiction for which there is no legally acceptable justification or excuse. Such, as property crimes, rape, robberies, assaults and kidnapping” Terrorist Crime: “The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives” As a Traditional Crime:

☐ Strictly as a Terrorist Crime:

Demographic Characteristics

6. Where do you work?

☐ Where do you work? Headquarters

☐ Field

7. What is your organizational status?

☐ What is your organizational status? Non-Supervisor

☐ Team Leader

☐ Supervisor

☐ Manager

☐ Executive

☐ Other

8. What is your age group?

☐ What is your age group? 25 and under

☐ 26-29

☐ 30-39
9. What is your pay category/grade?

- Director
- Superintendent
- First Deputy
- Colonel
- Lieutenant Colonel
- Major
- Captain
- Lieutenant

Other (please specify)

10. How long have you been with the State Government?

- Less than 1 year
- 1 to 3 years
- 4 to 5 years
- 6 to 10 years
- 11 to 14 years
- 15 to 20 years
- More than 20 years

Thank you.

I wish to thank you for taking time out of your busy day to complete this survey. Please click on the Done Button to submit the survey.

Joseph Iniguez, Student Researcher
Governors State University grants exempt approval for your project.

Please be advised that if you make any substantive changes in your research protocols, you must inform the IRB and have the new protocols approved. Please refer to your GSU project number when communicating with us about this research.